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Abstract
Cardiac arrhythmia, one of the most common causes of death in the world
today, is not always effectively detected by regular examinations, as it usually
occurs infrequently and suddenly. Therefore, real-time, continuous monitor-
ing of the heart rate is needed to detect arrythmia problems sooner and
prevent their severe consequences. To make continuous monitoring possible
and give it widespread acceptance, a portable heart rate monitoring sys-
tem must have three key characteristics: (1) accuracy, (2) portability, and
(3) long battery life. Previous studies have focused on addressing these prob-
lems separately, either improving the accuracy of the monitoring algorithm
or the efficiency of the underlying hardware.
This thesis proposes a robust and reliable heart rate monitoring system
(RRHMS), in which both algorithm accuracy and hardware efficiency are con-
sidered. As a result, algorithmic optimizations are exploited to enable further
hardware efficiency. In the RRHMS, robust heart rate monitoring is achieved
by extracting heart rates from both electrocardiogram (ECG) and arterial
blood pressure (ABP) signals and fusing them based on the signal qualities.
Therefore, accurate heart rate data can be provided continuously, even when
one signal is severely corrupted. Algorithmic optimizations are applied to
merge the separate ECG and ABP processing steps into shared ones, which
allows shared hardware modules and hence low-area (portable) hardware
design. Also, an embedded hardware architecture framework is proposed
for the design of the RRHMS hardware system. Coarse-grained functional
units (FUs) can be easily added or removed in this framework, allowing for
application-specific hardware optimization. Further, the application invari-
ant properties are used to achieve low-overhead fault tolerance in the FUs to
enhance reliability. Both ASIC and FPGA implementations of the RRHMS
are able to accurately detect heart rates in real time while consuming only
1/2870 and 1/923 of the energy required by the Android implementation.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis presents a Robust and Reliable Heart Rate Monitoring System
(RRHMS) to provide portable and real-time monitoring at low energy con-
sumption. The proposed RRHMS includes: (1) a robust heart rate detection
algorithm with multiple signal analysis and fusion, and (2) a reliable embed-
ded hardware design that efficiently runs the heart rate detection algorithm
and is able to tolerate low-level hardware faults.
Continuous monitoring of heart rate is key to detecting cardiac arrhythmia
problems, which affect more than 5 million Americans and result in more than
1.2 million hospitalizations and 400,000 deaths each year in the U.S. alone
[1]. Arrhythmias may occur at any age, and some of them are barely percep-
tible until a problem occurs [2]. Moreover, arrhythmia problems are often
characterized by suddenness and unpredictability. To realize the required
continuous monitoring and receive wide acceptance, three qualities are key
to heart rate monitoring systems: accuracy, portability, and battery life.
According to [3], the accuracy of the monitoring system depends on:
(1) correctness and quality of the raw input signal collected from sensors,
(2) adequacy of the signal analysis algorithm (e.g., removes signal noise,
correctly extracts features, has no bugs, etc.), and (3) correctness of the
underlying hardware that runs the monitoring algorithm. Addressing the first
issue with better sensor technology is not the focus of this thesis. However,
the proposed RRHMS considers the effect of sensor signal quality and is able
to provide continuous monitoring in scenarios with low-quality signals.
Impact of the Quality of Monitored Signals. Traditionally, heart rate in-
formation is acquired by detecting peaks (location of the highest magnitude
in the signal period) from the electrocardiogram (ECG) or arterial blood
pressure (ABP) signals; arrhythmia is detected by thresholding on the heart
rate. However, signal corruptions in ECG and ABP (such as noise, artifacts,
missing data, etc.) often result in inaccurate detection of peaks and then to
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false diagnoses [4]. The large number of false alarms in intensive care units
(ICUs) is an example of this problem. Studies [5, 6, 7] show that more than
80% of the alarms generated in ICU monitors are false and clinically insignif-
icant due to corruptions in the sensor signals and the simple thresholding
policy on a single signal. Although sophisticated signal filtering and analysis
techniques [8, 9, 10] can alleviate this problem to an extent, they do not work
when the signal corruption is severe. However, since noise and artifacts in
different signals are weakly correlated [11], robust heart rate estimation is
achieved in RRHMS by analyzing both ECG and ABP signals, as heart rate
can be estimated from both of them. Figure 1.1 shows three segments of
patient data from the MIMIC II database [12]. In Figure 1.1a, ABP signal is
good while ECG signal is corrupted by sensor noise and disconnection, and
during this period, the patient is experiencing the tachycardia problem. This
problem cannot be detected if only ECG is being monitored. However, if the
monitoring system considers both ABP and ECG signals, and if it detects
that ECG is currently having low signal quality while ABP signal is good
(Section 2.2.4 gives an overview of signal quality assessment methods), then
it can detect the problem by ignoring ECG and using only ABP. Figure 1.1b
shows the opposite case: the beginning part of ABP is noisy, but ECG is
good. Similarly, during that period, the monitoring system needs to ignore
ABP and use ECG to provide continuous heart rate monitoring. At last,
both ABP and ECG are good in Figure 1.1c, where a strong correlation be-
tween the two signals for providing heart rate information is shown by the
dotted lines. When both signals are good, the monitoring system can have
high confidence in estimating the heart rate.
Impact of Hardware Faults. On the other hand, even if the monitoring
algorithm is highly accurate, along with the scaling of transistor technology,
hardware components become increasingly susceptible to low-level transis-
tor faults that may propagate to cause the electronic systems to produce
incorrect results, hangs, or crashes [13]. Transient faults or soft errors are
the most common hardware faults, the rate of which is expected to have an
8% increase per logic state bit in each technology generation [14, 15]. For
heart rate monitoring, this may cause the system to generate incorrect heart
rate information or hang without notice. Therefore, enabling fault tolerance
capability, especially tolerance of transient faults, is important (sometimes
even life-critical) for heart rate monitoring systems. In addition, fault toler-
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(a) ABP is good while ECG is corrupted (patient is experiencing tachycardia)
(b) ABP is noisy while ECG is good
(c) Both ABP and ECG are good (ABP and ECG peak locations are correlated)
Figure 1.1: Three scenarios of ABP and ECG signals from the MIMIC II
database (patient a40050)
ance should not introduce large hardware area and power overheads (as with
the traditional double and triple modular redundancy techniques), which
jeopardize the portability and battery life of the monitoring system.
Portability and battery life are usually translated to hardware area and
power consumption. As discussed above, accurate real-time monitoring of the
heart rate requires concurrent recording and analysis of multiple biomedical
signals (ABP and ECG) collected at relatively high sampling rates (up to 10
kHz [16]). Therefore, portable monitoring systems often face challenges in
real-time processing of large amounts of biomedical signal data under tight
area and power constraints. Commercial off-the-shelf embedded processors,
such as the ARM microprocessor and DSP (digital signal processor), are not
the best solutions to provide continuous and portable biomedical monitor-
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ing. They are designed for general embedded applications with instruction-
level optimizations, but they lack the application-specific optimizations for
biomedical monitoring, and therefore, they do not offer the best performance
and power efficiency for running biomedical monitoring applications. The
comparison results in Section 6.3.1 between the proposed RRHMS and the
Qualcomm Krait processor [17] (architecturally similar to ARM Cortex-A15)
are proofs of this. In addition, higher power consumption drains the battery
faster, and as a result, a bigger and heavier battery is required, which affects
portability as well.
Existing studies and techniques have provided good solutions to the sep-
arate problems of monitoring accuracy and processing efficiency. For ex-
ample, studies in [8, 9, 10] have focused on developing noise filtering and
signal quality assessment techniques to obtain clean signals and the signal
quality information needed for improving the analysis accuracy. Other works
[18, 19] presented signal analysis algorithms for accurate peak detection of
either ECG or ABP signals. The algorithms proposed in [11, 20, 21, 22]
separately analyzed multiple signals, including ABP and ECG, and fuse the
analysis results to detect robust heart rate and reduce false alarm rates in
the detection of different cardiac arrhythmia problems. Moreover, Khatib et
al. [16] explored using ARM and DSP embedded processors to optimize an
autocorrelation-based ECG peak detection algorithm, and customized hard-
ware modules were applied by [23, 24, 25] to achieve further performance and
energy efficiency for previously developed ECG peak detection algorithms.
However, none of the previous works has considered addressing algorithm ac-
curacy and processing efficiency issues at the same time by including multiple
signal analysis and fusion techniques along with both software and hardware
design and optimizations. As a result, some software/hardware optimiza-
tion opportunities have been overlooked. In addition, none of the previous
biomedical monitoring hardware research has considered the important fea-
ture of hardware fault tolerance.
Design Overview. This thesis introduces RRHMS to address issues of both
monitoring accuracy and processing efficiency in order to achieve accuracy,
portability, and long battery life in heart rate monitoring. Figure 1.2 depicts
the overview of the proposed heart rate monitoring system. In RRHMS,
both ABP and ECG signals are analyzed and fused to achieve robustness.
Unlike previous signal-fusion systems, such as [20, 21], which extract heart
4
Figure 1.2: The proposed robust and reliable heart rate monitoring system
rate feature from ABP and ECG separately with different processing steps,
RRHMS considers both algorithm and hardware system design. Algorith-
mic optimizations are applied to estimate heart rates in both signals with
shared processing steps to allow hardware module sharing for efficient and
low-area (portable) hardware design. After extracting heart rates from both
signals, RRHMS evaluates their signal qualities and puts more weight (trust)
on the heart rate information extracted from the signal with the higher sig-
nal quality. In addition, to efficiently support the processing steps of the
heart rate detection algorithm, an embedded hardware architecture frame-
work with coarse-grained configurable functional units (FUs) is proposed
in which FUs can be added or removed in the architecture framework for
application-specific hardware optimizations. The reliability of RRHMS is
achieved by introducing a hardware fault tolerance technique that uses the
application-specific invariant property [26] for low-overhead fault detection
and recovery. The proposed fault tolerance technique is able to detect both
permanent and transient hardware faults in the FUs and dynamically recover
from transient faults in real time. To the best of our knowledge, RRHMS is
the first low-energy and fault tolerant hardware implementation for real-time
robust heart rate estimation by multiple signal analysis and fusion.
Experiments show that the algorithmically optimized peak detection algo-
rithm is able to match the results of the originally separate ABP and ECG
peak detection algorithms, and the applied fusion algorithm [21] provides
continuous robust heart rate information even when one signal is corrupted.
The proposed RRHMS is implemented in both the ASIC design using the
Synopsys Design Compiler [27] and on the FPGA platform with the Virtex 5
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ML507 board. The results of the implemented hardware on both platforms
are compared with MATLAB simulations to ensure implementation correct-
ness. The same algorithm is also implemented as an Android application on
a Nexus 7 tablet (equipped with the Qualcomm Krait processor) for compar-
ison. The simulation results show that, compared with Android, both ASIC
and FPGA implementations achieve better runtime performance (20.6 and
13.7 times speedup, respectively) at much lower power consumptions (1/139
and 1/67 of Android’s power, respectively). Moreover, the proposed fault tol-
erance technique enhances system reliability by increasing the correct output
percentage under injected hardware faults. It is able to reduce more than
55% of incorrect outputs and system failures under all tested fault rates. In
addition, the proposed fault tolerance mechanism has only about a 15% area
(resource) overhead in the hardware logics, and during normal monitoring
when no fault occurs, it only introduces about a 34% power overhead (due
to fault detection checking) and does not incur any performance overhead.
1.1 Contributions
The specific contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows:
• We apply algorithmic optimizations to ECG and ABP heart rate de-
tection algorithms developed by [18] and [28], respectively. The opti-
mizations enables shared processing steps between the two originally
separate processing flows. As a result, some hardware modules that
are used to efficiently support ECG and ABP processing are shared.
The shared modules account for about 45% of the hardware logics,
effectively cutting the hardware area in half.
• We propose an embedded hardware architecture framework with coarse-
grained configurable functional units (FUs) to perform energy-efficient
computations. The FUs can be configured within a few cycles to switch
between ABP and ECG analysis or between different patients. Ad-
ditionally, FUs are designed following a framework design template,
which gives them the same interfaces. This makes it easy to add or re-
move FUs in the architecture framework to achieve application-specific
hardware optimizations for the target embedded application.
6
• We propose and design a low-overhead hardware fault detection and
recovery engine that monitors the activities of the FUs and applies
invariant checking and heartbeats to detect hardware faults. Upon
detection of faults, the corresponding FU is reset and re-executed by
the fault detection and recovery engine in real time to dynamically
recover from the transient fault. Permanent faults, however, can only
be detected, not recovered from.
• We implement the RRHMS prototype both in the ASIC design and on
the FPGA platform to evaluate runtime performance, power and energy
consumption, and fault tolerance coverage and overheads of the pro-
posed fault detection and recovery engine. ASIC is the target platform
for the final product of RRHMS, while in the FPGA implementation,
the proposed hardware architecture is evaluated as the framework to
support the target embedded application.
Homa Alemzadeh and Yangyang Yu are my collaborators in this thesis
work. In particular, Alemzadeh has helped in (1) the proposal and im-
plementation of the multiple signal (ECG and ABP) analysis and fusion
algorithm, (2) the algorithmic optimizations to merge the separate ECG and
ABP analysis algorithms, and (3) the design of the RRHMS hardware ar-
chitecture framework. Yangyang has helped with the implementation of the
coarse-grained FUs and the ASIC synthesis of the RRHMS.
1.2 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides the back-
ground of biomedical signal monitoring as well as the work in this field that
motivates the development of RRHMS. Chapter 3 introduces each process-
ing step of the RRHMS heart rate detection algorithm, including the applied
algorithmic optimization. Chapter 4 discusses in detail the proposed base-
line RRHMS hardware system without fault tolerance features, followed by
discussion of the proposed low-overhead fault tolerance design in Chapter 5.
Chapter 6 introduces the experiments performed and the results obtained
in evaluating RRHMS. The thesis concludes and future work is described in
Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we provide an overview of the background of biomedical mon-
itoring. First, common biomedical signals used in the monitoring are briefly
introduced, followed by discussion of software and hardware approaches pre-
viously proposed to analyze and extract features from those biomedical sig-
nals. Previous work provides us with valuable insights of the characteristics
of different biomedical signals, as well as useful analysis of the efficiency of
different hardware systems for biomedical signal processing. However, the
related previous work, such as the work in signal beat detection and signal
fusion, focuses on developing and applying separate signal processing steps
to extract features from different signals. Additionally, previous biomedical
hardware work only uses the hardware capability for efficient computations
of previously developed algorithms. None of the work considers software op-
timizations for efficient hardware design or the fault tolerance capability of
the hardware.
2.1 Biomedical Signals
Biomedical (or physiological) signals are the signals produced by the body
during the functioning of various physiological systems [29]. Information
about the state of the physiological system can be extracted from the cor-
responding biomedical signals. The common biomedical signals being moni-
tored and checked in hospitals are: electrocardiogram (ECG), arterial blood
pressure (ABP), peripheral capillary oxygen saturation (SpO2), and respira-
tory rate. These four commonly used signals are the ones typically studied
in the literatures of biomedical monitoring algorithms. Figure 2.1 shows an
example segment of each of these four biomedical signals. Each signal is
collected by a different bio-sensor. Table 2.1 lists the sensors used to collect
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Figure 2.1: Commonly used biomedical signals (from the MIMIC database)
Table 2.1: Bio-sensors used to collect different biomedical signals
Biomedical
Signal Sensor Working Principle
ECG ECG electrodes Detect the rise and fall of voltage caused
by heart muscle depolarizing between
the two electrodes placed at either side
of the heart.
ABP Pulse oximeters
with pressure sensor
Control and measure counter pressure to
keep constant finger blood volume.
SpO2 Pulse oximeters Measure and calculate the emitted light
absorbed by the finger tip.
Respiratory
rate
1. Capnography
or
2. Pneumatograph
1. Monitor the concentration or partial
pressure of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the
respiratory gases.
2. Record velocity and force of the chest
movements during respiration.
each signal, along with a brief description of each sensor’s working principles.
ECG signal records the electrical activity of the heart. Up to 12 leads
of ECG signals can be obtained by placing electrodes at different places
on the body [30], and they together provide accurate ECG analysis [16].
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ECG signals are often used to detect various cardiac diseases and problems
[31, 32, 33], including coronary heart disease, pericardium disease, cardiac
arrhythmias, etc. ABP signal indirectly indicates information about the
health state of the heart and blood vessels. Low blood pressure, or clinical
shock, usually indicates a medical emergency situation in the intensive care
unit or during the surgery operation, and high blood pressure is a sign of
chronic condition hypertension [34]. Heart rate and cardiac output (which
is a key parameter in assessing circulatory function) can be estimated from
ABP waveforms as well [35]. SpO2 signal measures the blood oxygen
saturation level, which is the percentage of hemoglobin in the blood that is
saturated with oxygen, and indicates if sufficient oxygen is being supplied to
the body, especially to the lungs [36]. Respiratory rate is the number of
breaths taken within a set amount of time. Monitoring of respiratory rate
is important in postoperative care, because some operations, like abdominal
operations, might cause central or obstructive apnoea [37, 38]. In addition,
Fieselmann et al. [39] show that monitoring respiratory rates is helpful in
reducing the chance of cardiopulmonary arrest.
Processing and operations on those biomedical signals follow the same gen-
eral operation flow depicted in Figure 2.2. First, the raw biomedical signals
are collected from the body using bio-sensors (Table 2.1). After collection
of the raw signals, signal processing methods are applied to extract useful
features from the signals to identify patient problems and make diagnostic
decisions (for example, the QRS complex feature extracted from ECG is used
in [22, 40, 41] to identify asystole, ventricular tachycardia, coronary artery
disease, and so on). In addition, the processing of the raw biomedical signals
Figure 2.2: General operation flow of biomedical signals
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also follows the four general processing steps as shown in Figure 2.2 (in the
dash-line box): preprocessing, peak/onset detection, feature extraction, and
diagnosis. (Section 2.2 discusses each step in detail.)
This thesis focuses on heart rate monitoring. ECG, ABP, and SpO2 signals
all contain information about heart rate, as the electrical activity recorded by
ECG, the blood pressure waveform in ABP, and the pulse oximeter’s plethys-
mograph for SpO2 calculation are periodic with the heart beats. Only ECG
and ABP signals are used in this thesis because we found few patient SpO2
signals during the period in which both ECG and ABP signals were valid in
the MIMIC II database. However, since SpO2 has waveform shapes similar
to ABP, we believe the RRHMS heart rate detection and fusion algorithm,
as well as the RRHMS hardware system, can be used to efficiently process
the SpO2 signal and fuse the heart rate extracted from it as well. If SpO2
is included in RRHMS, the heart rate estimation would be more robust, for
it could then tolerate severe signal corruptions in up to two out of the three
signals.
2.2 Biomedical Monitoring Algorithm
Numerous algorithms to extract and analyze features from biomedical sig-
nals have been proposed and studied, especially with ECG and ABP signals.
Different works focus on the different processing steps shown in the dash-
line box of Figure 2.2. This section discusses in detail the purpose of each
processing step and the techniques used or developed for each step in the
literature, along with a brief introduction to the technique applied for each
processing step in RRHMS. We were motivated by the literature to devel-
op them, and at the same time, we considered the effect of the processing
algorithm development on the hardware design and optimization.
2.2.1 Preprocessing
The raw biomedical signals obtained from the bio-sensors often contain a lot
of noise, making the features difficult to extract correctly from the signal.
So the preprocessing stage is applied to (1) reduce the noise in the signal (to
maximize the signal-to-noise ratio), and (2) highlight the interested feature
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Figure 2.3: Noise in ECG signal and filtered ECG signal [42]
information.
Figure 2.3 illustrates an example of ECG signal before and after noise
removal. Signal noise is normally caused by different types of artifacts and
interferences in the sensors [43, 44], such as power line interference, electrode
contact noise, motion artifacts, etc. Digital filters, such as low-pass, high-
pass, and median filters, are the most commonly used method for signal noise
removal, as used in [45, 46, 47, 48]. To simplify the digital filter design and
realize fast computation on small computers, Lynn [8] proposed the “fast
designs” for a class of digital filters for biomedical signals, including the
recursive and non-recursive low-pass, high-pass, band-pass, and band-stop
filters. In addition, digital differentiation and squaring are used in [18, 49] to
further remove noise and highlight peak locations for ECG QRS detection.
More recent studies [10, 50, 51, 52] use adaptive filters (with electrode-skin
impedance as the reference signal) and wavelet-based techniques for the noise
removal in ECG signals. The extended Kalman filter is applied on the ABP
signal in [53] for signal artifact smoothing. RRHMS applies the digital filter
method to remove noise in ABP and ECG signals. It is designed following the
method developed by [8], based on its efficiency and simplicity of hardware
implementation.
As for feature highlighting, slope sum has been used in [20] to highlight
and smooth the rising portion of the ABP signal. It has an effect similar
to the moving-window integration used in [18]. But since the two works
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[18, 20] focus on the processing of ABP and ECG signals, respectively, two
separate feature highlighting methods with similar effect were developed.
Since RRHMS considers the processing of both signals, as well as hardware
optimization, we optimized by algorithmically merging these two separate
processing steps into a single step that highlights the rising portions of both
ABP and ECG signals. As a result, RRHMS requires only a single, shared
hardware module for efficient feature highlighting.
2.2.2 Peak/Onset Detection
Many biomedical signals, such as ECG, ABP, SpO2, etc., are periodic with
the heart beat. Features extracted within a beat (e.g., systolic/diastolic
blood pressure values, ECG QRS shape, beat-to-beat interval, etc.) and
their changes from beat to beat are the foundations of detecting diseases and
problems. Therefore, it is critical to accurately identify the beat or period
of the biomedical signals to accurately extract features used for diagnosis
[54, 55]. Signal peak/onset detection techniques were developed for this pur-
pose, and three detection techniques are commonly used: (1) threshold-based
detection, (2) frequency analysis detection, and (3) template matching de-
tection.
Many works [18, 28, 56, 57, 58] apply the threshold-based peak/onset de-
tection method by thresholding on the signals in the time domain, combined
with local maximum and minimum searching. For example, Zong et al. [28]
designed the ABP onset decision rules in this way. First, adaptive thresh-
olding is applied on the slope summed signal (used to highlight the rising
portion of the raw ABP signal) to detect the onset. Then, local maximum
and minimum searching is applied around the onset point to decide whether
to accept the detected onset based on the difference between the maximum
and minimum values. In [18], the ECG peak or QRS detection algorithm
uses two thresholds to detect the ECG QRS complex. The higher threshold
is used for the first-time analysis of the signal, while the lower threshold is
applied if no QRS is detected within a certain amount of time; this enables
back-searching for the QRS complex. The threshold values are usually dy-
namically updated to adapt to the on-the-fly signal changes. This is done
according to different rules and conditions, such as signal quality and noise
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level. A common method used in the literature to update the threshold values
is to use the weighted sum function. When a peak is detected, the threshold
values are updated by applying the weighted sum to the old threshold values
and the new values that come from the newly detected peak.
Frequency domain analysis, such as filter bank, power spectrum, and en-
ergy analysis, is another popular method to detect beats. Power spectrum
analysis has been applied as an intermediate step in [59] for beat detection
of the pressure signals, such as the intracranial pressure, ABP, and SpO2
signals. Pachauri and Bhuyan [19] applied the window-based energy analysis
technique, combined with the amplitude and interval thresholds, to detec-
t peaks in the ABP signal. In addition, the filter bank based ECG beat
detection algorithms have been introduced in [54, 60, 61]. Generally, the
filter bank based algorithm involves (1) decomposing the signal into fre-
quency subbands, (2) processing the subbands according to the application,
and (3) reconstructing the processed subbands for further analysis. The fre-
quency domain analysis methods use the fact that signal peaks are usually
concentrated in a different frequency range from the signal noise and other
uninteresting segments. For example, the energy of ECG peaks usually con-
centrates around the frequency of 40 Hz [61]. As a result, the ECG peaks
are detected in the filter bank techniques by analyzing the corresponding
frequency subband.
In addition, the template matching method is used in [16, 62] for ECG beat
detection. Template matching evaluates the similarity between the input
signal in with a template signal period by performing auto-correlation or
cross-correlation calculations. The template signal period is predefined or
trained, and the calculated local maximum correlation value indicates the
detection of a signal period (beat) in the input signal.
Even though the previously proposed beat detection algorithms obtain
good results with high accuracy, they are developed for specific signals (e.g.,
some algorithms are only developed for ECG, while others are developed for
ABP). Therefore, if both ABP and ECG beats need to be detected, separate
beat detection algorithms have to be used for each type of signal. This is not
a big problem if a general purpose processor is applied as the platform for
the processing involved in beat detection. However, if application-specific
hardware is used for highly efficient and portable processing, separate al-
gorithms require separate coarse-grained hardware modules, and therefore
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would occupy more hardware area and consume more power. To solve this
problem, as in the case if the preprocessing steps, we developed a single
peak detection algorithm in RRHMS by applying algorithmic optimizations
to merge (1) the threshold-based ABP onset detection algorithm proposed in
[28], and (2) the ECG QRS complex detection algorithm (threshold-based)
developed by [18]. We chose the threshold-based detection algorithm, be-
cause it can achieve good runtime and accuracy performance with less com-
plicated hardware design. On the other hand, the frequency-based analysis
is computation-intensive and requires complicated hardware modules to per-
form transformations between time and frequency domains. Further, the
template matching method does not adapt well to detecting nonstationary
patterns (its accuracy decreases when the signal pattern changes).
2.2.3 Feature Extraction
After the beat is detected, features can be extracted from the signal period.
At this stage, many diseases and problems can be detected by simply thresh-
olding on their corresponding feature values. For example, hypotension and
hypertension problems are detected by thresholding on the systolic and dias-
tolic blood pressures, where systolic blood pressure is the peak ABP value of
the period and diastolic blood pressure is the valley ABP value of the period.
The heart rate feature is computed with the beat-to-beat interval, which is
the interval between detected beats, and cardiac arrhythmias are detected
by thresholding on the heart rate. In addition, the ABP pulse pressure (the
difference between systolic and diastolic pressures), ECG beat shape, ECG
ST and QT intervals, and other values contain information about a person’s
cardiac health [63, 64, 65].
The above features are directly extracted from each beat, so we call them
first-level features. However, simply thresholding on the first-level features
often results in a large number of false alarms. This is because first-level
features tend to be sensitive to signal noise or artifacts. Even with sophisti-
cated preprocessing techniques, some noise may not be completely eliminat-
ed, which may result in incorrect first-level feature extractions and therefore
false alarms. On the other hand, although the alarms generated by some
sudden changes in the signals (that quickly come back to normal) are techni-
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cally true alarms in the beat period where the change happens, those alarms
are often clinically insignificant. The observation has been made in [66] that
“rapid changes in the readings that swiftly return to normal are more likely
non-physiological than those which are persistent and form a trend.” In addi-
tion, the similar claim has been made in [67] that “false alarms tend to occur
fleetingly, while true alarms tend to develop more slowly.” Therefore, many
methods do not rely only on first-level features to make diagnostic decisions
but use second-level features as well.
Second-level features (defined by us) are features that are computed based
on first-level features but are usually more robust to random noise and less
sensitive to sudden non-physiological signal changes. For example, a second-
level feature can be obtained by the statistical computation of first-level
features within a time interval, such as the average, maximum, or minimum.
In [66], the difference between the average heart rate in the current minute
and that of three minutes ago is used to detect any change or trend in the
heart rate, which helps filter false alarms. In [67], first-level features, such
as ECG heart rate, respiratory rate, ABP mean and systolic pressures, are
analyzed by windows of 10, 20, and 45 seconds. Within each interval, second-
level features such as the mean, median, maximum, minimum, or standard
deviation are computed for each first-level feature. The second-level features
then are used by a machine learning algorithm to discover medical events,
such as decreases in blood pressure, that require clinical attention. Seventeen-
second ABP and ECG waveform segments are analyzed in [22], within which
maximum, minimum, and mean heart rates are computed to reduce false
alarms in detecting critical arrhythmias. Apiletti et al. [68] use the moving
average on the first-level features of systolic and diastolic pressures, heart
rate, and SpO2 to obtain second-level features for assessment of health status.
In addition, some problems can be detected only by looking at second-
level features. For example, some current and potential cardiac diseases are
undetectable using only the first-level heart rate feature but can be detected
through analysis of the second-level feature of heart rate variability (HRV)
over time [69].
To achieve robust heart rate monitoring, RRHMS calculates a second-level
heart rate feature using the average heart rates of 10-second windows. This
is key to accurately detecting several kinds of cardiac arrhythmia problems
as well as to correctly analyzing the HRV. Table 2.2 lists some critical cardiac
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Table 2.2: Arrhythmia problems that can be detected with RRHMS
Arrhythmia
Type Definition Example Pattern
Asystole No cardiac output
for 4 seconds
Extreme
Bradycardia
Resting heart rate
below 40 bpm
Extreme
Tachycardia
Resting heart rate
above 140 bpm
arrhythmias that can be detected with heart rate monitoring, along with a
brief problem description and example signal pattern of the corresponding
problem. The window interval chosen for use in RRHMS is large to minimize
the effect of signal noise and non-physiological changes. Also, 10 seconds
is the maximum delay allowed to meet the real-time arrhythmia detection
criterion of AAMI-EC-13 Cardiotach Standard [22].
2.2.4 Signal Quality Assessment
Some signal noises, artifacts, and abnormalities (e.g., those due to sensor
movement or disconnection) can hardly be removed or fixed by signal filtering
techniques. Figure 2.4, reproduced from [9], shows an example of a clinical
ABP signal with abnormal regions, where the abnormalities are caused by
sensor movements, not by problems in patient. When such an abnormality
occurs, false alarms are very likely. Therefore, signal quality assessment
techniques are developed to help identify the regions of the biomedical signals
where noise or abnormality occurs and thus to further improve the accuracy
of the signal analysis and diagnosis.
By observing and studying the nature of the normal signals, as well as
the characteristics of different kinds of noise and artifacts, previous work
[9, 20, 21, 70, 71] has developed various methods to evaluate signal quality
and identify signal noise level. Sun et al. [9] flag the abnormal beats in
the ABP signal by thresholding on the first-level features extracted from the
beat, including systolic, diastolic, mean, and pulse pressures, beat duration,
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Figure 2.4: ABP waveform with abnormal regions [9]
and their differences between consecutive beats. Thresholds are set based
on normal physiological ranges. For example, systolic blood pressure never
exceeds 300 mmHg, so if an ABP beat has a peak value larger than 300,
the beat is flagged as abnormal. Fuzzy logic is used in [20] to assess the
quality of ABP beats by measuring how much the features of a detected beat
deviate from the model features. Model features are trained using normal
ABP signals and averaging the feature values extracted from each beat in
the training period. Zong et al. [20] compute additional APB beat features
based on those used in [9], including maximum positive and negative pres-
sure slope, maximum up-slope duration, and so on. Kurtosis and spectral
distribution analysis are applied by [21] to evaluate the signal quality of the
ECG signal. Kurtosis is the fourth standardized moment and measures the
peakedness of a distribution. A low kurtosis value in an ECG signal indicates
the low-frequency baseline wonder noise and the high-frequency power-line
interference noise. Spectral distribution analysis relies on the fact that ECG
peaks and noise are concentrated in different frequency bands. So the ener-
gy ratio of the frequency band containing ECG peaks indicates the quality
of the ECG signal. Besides kurtosis, He et al. [70] use the variance index
as an extra measure of ECG noise and abnormality level. In [71], the area
differences between successive ECG beats, including adjacent beats, every
other beat, every third beat, etc., are calculated to generate the statistical
distributions used to assess ECG signal quality.
RRHMS evaluates the signal quality of both ABP and ECG and uses this
information in fusing the heart rates extracted from the two signals. This
minimizes the chance of incorrect heart rate estimations caused by signal
noise or abnormality that cannot be fixed in the preprocessing step. RRHMS
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signal qualities are calculated based on the previously developed methods
[9, 20, 21].
2.2.5 Multi-Signal Analysis and Fusion
The fact that the causes of noise and artifacts in different bio-sensors are dif-
ferent and independent [11], inspired proposal of multi-parameter biomedical
signal analysis and fusion methods to:
(1) suppress false alarms generated by a single signal by exploiting the
relationship between different sensor signals,
(2) improve the accuracy of disease and problem detection by fusing the
features extracted from different signals, and
(3) provide robust and continuous monitoring, even when some signals are
erroneous or corrupted, by using the redundant information in different
signals.
The techniques used to fuse the analysis of different signals can be catego-
rized as: (1) rule-based fusion , which establishes rules and thresholds to
fuse the results of different signals, (2) numeric-based fusion , which fuses
the features extracted from different signals with numeric calculations, such
as weighted sum (or weighted average), and (3) machine learning-based
fusion , which combines the features acquired from different signals into the
feature vectors and applies machine learning techniques to train and classify
for specific problem detection. Table 2.3 lists some fusion techniques in each
category.
The rule-based fusion method is applied by [22] and [72], using ABP and
PLETH signals respectively, to reduce false alarms of arrhythmia in the ECG
monitors used in intensive care units. The approach is to analyze the other
signal (ABP and PLETH) whenever the ECG monitor raises an arrhythmi-
a alarm, since it should contain redundant information. If the arrhythmia
problem indicated by the ECG monitor’s alarm is also detected in the re-
dundant signal, the ECG alarm is accepted, otherwise it is rejected. Using
the same rule-based method but in an opposite manner, Zong et al. [20] try
to suppress the false alarms generated by the commercial ABP monitors by
incorporating the ECG signal in computing the signal quality of ABP beats
based on some rules and thresholds, such as thresholding on the ECG-ABP
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Table 2.3: Previous multi-signal analysis and fusion work
Signal
Fusion
Works
Application
Purpose
Raw
Signal Features Technique Description
Rule-Based Fusion
Aboukhalil
et al. [22]
Reduce false
alarms in ECG
monitors by using
ABP signal.
Alarms include:
- Asystole
- Extreme bradycardia
- Extreme tachycardia
- Ventricular
tachycardia
- ABP
- ECG
- Heart rate
- Beat-to-beat interval
- Max. interval within a window
- Min. interval within a window
- Average heart rate in a window
- Signal abnormality index [20]
- Reject ECG alarms by
thresholding on the features
extracted from ABP signal
within the analysis window.
- Design different threshold
rules for different life-
threatening alarms listed in
the application purpose cell.
Zong
et al. [20]
Reduce false alarms
in the commercial
ABP monitor by
using ECG signal.
- ABP
- ECG
- Heart rate
- Systolic, diastolic, mean, and
pulse blood pressures
- Max. positive pressure slope
- Max. negative pressure slope
- Max. up-slope duration
- Max. duration above threshold
- ECG-ABP peak delay time
- Calculate both signal
qualities of ABP and ECG.
- Apply ECG signal to
adjust the beat qualities
computed for ABP signal.
- Use the adjusted ABP
signal quality as criteria
to suppress alarms generat-
ed by ABP monitor.
Deshmane
[72]
Suppress false alarms
generated by the
ECG monitor.
- ECG
- PLETH
- Heart rate
- Beat-to-beat interval
- Max. interval within a window
- Min. interval within a window
- Average heart rate in a window
- Signal quality of PLETH
- Suppress ECG alarms by
thresholding on the features
extracted from PLETH
within the analysis window.
- Design the threshold rules
and alarm reduction
framework similar to [22].
Numeric-Based Fusion
Li et al.
[21]
Provide robust heart
rate estimation.
- ABP
- ECG
- Heart rate
- ABP and ECG signal qualities
obtained by applying previously
developed methods
[9, 20, 70, 71]
- Apply Kalman filter on the
ABP and ECG heart rates.
- Obtain robust heart rate by
applying weighted sum on
the two estimated heart
rates based on the signal qu-
alities and Kalman residues.
Ebrahim
et al. [11]
Provide robust heart
rate estimation.
- ABP
- ECG
- PLETH
- Heart rate
- Identify erroneous sensor
estimates by analyzing: a)
consensus between sensors,
b) comparison between curr-
ent measurement and the
predicted value, and c)
physiologic consistency of
the estimates.
- Fuse sensor heart rates by
weighted sum, excluding the
erroneous estimate.
Apiletti
et al. [68]
Propose frame work to
classify health severity
levels.
- ABP
- ECG
- PLETH
- Heart rate
- Systolic and diastolic blood
pressures
- SpO2
- Compute risk component
for each signal feature,
such as sharp changes, long-
term trends, and distance
from normal behaviors
(similar to second-level
feature computations).
- Estimate health severity
level by applying weighted
sum on all computed risk
components.
(Continued on next page)
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Table 2.3 (cont.): Previous multi-signal analysis and fusion work
Signal
Fusion
Work
Application
Purpose
Raw
Signal Features Technique Description
Numeric-Based Fusion - continued
Kannathal
et al. [73]
1. Detect:
- left ventricular failure
- right ventricular
failure
- pulmonary oedema
2. Derive patient
deterioration index.
- ABP
- ECG
- PLETH
- RESP
- Heart rate
- systolic, diastolic, and
mean blood pressures
- SpO2
- respiratory rate
- Apply fuzzy logic function
with the input of quantized
feature values to calculate the
fuzzy probability of each failure.
- Use weighted sum for each
failure probability to obtain
the deterioration index.
Machine Learning-Based Fusion
Biosign
[74]
Identify adverse trends
in the patient health
status and provide early
warning of changes.
- ABP
- ECG
- PLETH
- RESP
- Temper-
ature
- Heart rate
- Systolic blood pressure
- SpO2
- Respiratory rate
- Apply k-means clustering on
the feature vectors to select
500 cluster centers.
- Use Parzen window with the
500 prototype patterns as
kernels to estimate the
unconditional probability
density function, which is
used to derive the patient
status index.
Tsien [67]
Detect medical event,
such as ECG lead
apnea, false alarms
due to patient motion,
blood pressure decrease,
etc.
- ABP
- ECG
- PLETH
- RESP
- Heart rate
- Systolic and mean blood
pressures
- SpO2
- Respiratory rate
- Apply supervised machine
learning method (decision tree)
to classify the feature vectors
for the detection of different
medical events with the corres-
pondingly trained models, where
feature vectors are composed
of the computed second-level
features (min., max., median,
etc. of a window).
Li and
Clifford
[75]
Suppress false
arrhythmia alarms
to improve detection
accuracy.
- ABP
- ECG
- PLETH
- Heart rate
- Systolic, diastolic, mean,
and pulse blood pressures
- SpO2
- Area difference of beats
- Use a genetic algorithm to
select pertinent features from
a large set of feature pool
(second-level features computed
within window intervals, such
as maximum, minimum, median,
variance, gradient, etc.).
- Apply relevance vector
machine to train and classify
the selected feature vectors to
improve detection accuracy.
beat delay time. The alarm generated by the the ABP monitor is judged by
the ECG-adjusted ABP signal quality for acceptance. So rule-based, multi-
signal analysis is not strictly a fusion method, as it does not actually fuse
any features. It just uses other signals to judge the alarm raised by a single
signal.
Work in robust heart rate detection [11, 21] and patient health status iden-
tification [68, 73] apply the numerical-based fusion method. In [11, 21], the
robust heart rate is obtained by computing the weighted sum of the heart
rates estimated from each sensor signal. Ebrahim et al. [11] first identify
artifacts or erroneous sensor estimates and excludes them from the process
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of the weighted sum. The sensor to be excluded is identified using the three
metrics listed in the corresponding technique description cell in Table 2.3.
[21] uses the previously developed signal quality assessment methods and
proposes a novel use of the Kalman filter to compute the weights of different
sensor signals. Risk components, such as sharp changes, long-term trends,
and distance from normal behaviors, for each signal feature are quantified
in [68]. The overall health severity level is derived by applying the weighted
sum of the risk levels calculated using the risk components. In addition,
Kannathal et al. [73] apply fuzzy logic functions to obtain the fuzzy proba-
bilities of different cardiac failures. It uses a weighted sum with all the failure
probabilities to derive a patient deterioration index to detect clinical status
changes. The numeric-based fusion method is simple and flexible, as the fea-
tures obtained from different sensor signals are easily fused through simple
numerical calculations (yielding the weighted sum) and the signal weights
can be adjusted using knowledge of the signals, such as their qualities and
noise levels.
Machine learning-based fusion has been used for detecting broad medical
conditions. In this approach, all the features extracted from different signals
are grouped in feature vectors. Machine learning techniques are then applied
to cluster or classify the vectors to detect various problems. For example,
[74] uses k-means clustering with the features of heart rate, systolic blood
pressure, SpO2, respiratory rate, and temperature to select 500 cluster cen-
ters. It then applies the Parzen window to derive a patient status index
that can provide early warning of the patient status changes. Tsien [67]
extracts 120 features from four raw signals and applies the supervised learn-
ing method to classify the feature vectors for different medical events with
correspondingly trained models. Similarly, 114 signal features are extracted
in [75], and a genetic algorithm is applied to select useful features from the
large feature pool. The selected features are input to a trained relevance
vector machine that classifies the feature vectors for detection of different
arrhythmia problems. The works that apply machine learning-based fusion
methods can obtain good results but have very high computation complex-
ity, especially when on-line training is needed. Therefore, they may not be
applicable in real-time monitoring when online model training is needed to
adapt to signal changes or for patient-specific monitoring.
22
Multi-signal analysis and fusion are applied in RRHMS to provide robust
and continuous monitoring. The previous work provide us with insights in-
to different ways to fuse the analysis of multiple signals. We applied the
numeric-based fusion method used in [21] to fuse the heart rates acquired
from the ABP and ECG signals. We chose this method for its simplicity and
flexibility when implemented in portable hardware for patient-specific mon-
itoring in real time. However, the previous multi-signal analysis and fusion
efforts only focus on the fusion itself; they acquire the raw features (such as
heart rate) directly from the monitoring machines or calculate them using
the previously developed noise filtering and beat-detection methods (differ-
ent methods are used to process different signals with separate processing
flows). In contrast, RRHMS deals with the whole computation, from signal
preprocessing, to beat detection, to feature extraction and fusion, as well
as the hardware design for real-time portable monitoring. So RRHMS can
optimize the processing of separate signals for portable hardware design by
developing shared processing steps for multiple signals, which in turn enables
shared hardware modules. This takes us beyond the scope of the previous
work in signal fusion.
2.3 Biomedical Monitoring Hardware
To enable efficient biomedical signal processing and analysis in real time,
biomedical monitoring hardware has been developed. Based on the applied
hardware platform, the work dealing with hardware is classified into four cat-
egories: (1) embedded-processor (DSP and ARM) based, (2) coarse-grained
reconfigurable array (CGRA) based, (3) FPGA-based, or (4) ASIC-based.
Table 2.4 compares the hardware work in each category.
Embedded-processor based approaches [16, 76, 77] propose system-on-chip
(SoC) solutions to optimize the biomedical signal processing algorithms on
off-the-shelf embedded processors, such as DSP and ARM. ARM micropro-
cessors are used in [77] as the processing unit of the proposed SoC platform
for efficient implementation of the Pan & Tompkins ECG QRS detection al-
gorithm [18]. The auto-correlation based ECG peak detection algorithm is
optimized by [16] on the DSP processor, and a SoC design is proposed to
connect multiple DSP processors for parallel processing of the ECG signals
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Table 2.4: Previous biomedical monitoring hardware work
Hard-
ware
Work
Signal
to
process
Target
Applic-
ation
Hardware
Design
Description
Perf.
and
Energy
Effcy.
Flexi-
bility*
Multi-
Signal
Fusion
Fault
Tole-
rance Comment
Embedded Processors (DSP and ARM)
Khatib
et al.
[16]
ECG
Auto-
correlation
based
peak
detection
VLIW DSP process-
ors are connected to
the system bus to
access on-chip and
off-chip memories.
Up to 12 lead ECG
can be analyzed and
each lead can be
assigned to a DSP
for processing.
Med.
Low
High No No - DSP and ARM do not
offer the best perfor-
mance and energy
efficiency for portable
biomedical monitor-
ing, as they are
designed for general
embedded applica-
tions with fine-grained
instruction-set level
optimizations, such as
VLIW instruction
issue, circular buffer
operations, etc.
However, they do not
have coarse-grained
hardware optimiza-
tions specifically
designed for the
biomedical
applications.
Kim
et al.
[76]
ECG
Wavelet-
based
peak
detection
It is composed of:
a) analog front-
end to obtain raw
ECG signal, and
b) DSP back-end
to process the
collected ECG.
Med.
Low
High No No
Chang
et al.
[77]
ECG
Pan &
Tompkins
QRS
detection
A system-on-chip
design architecture
is proposed for ECG
QRS detection,
which incorporates
an ARM992T
macrocell and other
components
connected by the
system AMBA bus.
Low High No No
Coarse-Grained Reconfigurable Array (CGRA)
SYS-
CORE
[78]
General
bio-
signals
General
biomedical
applica-
tions
Novel CGRA funct-
ional unit and array
interconnections are
designed for energy-
efficient DSP
computations,
such as FIR filter,
matrix multipli-
cation, FFT, etc.,
that may be useful
for the biomedical
applications.
Med. High No No - CGRA provides extra
data parallelism and
efficiency than DSP
and ARM to perform
data intensive digital
signal processing, but
its efficiency depends
on the compiler tech-
niques to map the
application to the
functional unit array.
- CGRA configuration
is fine-grained and
has non-negligible
overhead to send the
configuration bits.
- Many beat detection
algorithms are control
intensive, instead of
data intensive, which
CGRA cannot effic-
iently support.
ULP-
SRP
[79]
General
bio-
signals
General
biomedical
applica-
tions
CGRA is used for
general biomedical
applications by
efficiently execut-
ing DSP functions.
Three execution
modes are designed:
VLIW and CGRA
low/high perform-
ance modes, which
can be dynamically
switched between
each other according
to the runtime
application needs
and requirements.
Med. High No No
(Ccontinued on next page)
* Flexibility means how flexible the hardware can be in supporting biomedical applications other than the one it is
designed or optimized for.
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Table 2.4 (cont.): Previous biomedical monitoring hardware work
Hard-
ware
Work
Signal
to
process
Target
Applic-
ation
Hardware
Design
Description
Perf.
and
Energy
Effcy.
Flexi-
bility*
Multi-
Signal
Fusion
Fault
Tole-
rance Comment
FPGA
Ieong
et al.
[24]
Stojan-
ovic´
et al.
[25]
ECG
Wavelet-
based
QRS
detection
Specialized
hardware blocks
are designed and
implemented on
FPGA for efficient
pipelined wavelet
decomposition.
Med.
High
Low No No - These works just apply
FPGA optimizations for
the previously developed
ECG beat detection
algorithms, and have not
considered the case when
the signal being
monitored has low signal
quality or the possible
algorithm optimizations
for further hardware
efficiency.
Cvikl
and
Zemva
[80]
ECG
ECG
beat
detection
and
classi-
fication
An FPGA-based
system-on-chip
design is imple-
mented, which
uses the FPGA
logics for ECG
beat detection
and uses the
embedded Power-
PC processor on
the FPGA board
for heart beat
classification.
Med.
High
Low No No
ASIC
Pavl-
atos
et al.
[23]
ECG
Pan &
Tompkins
QRS
detection
ASIC hardware
blocks are design-
ed for each proce-
ssing stage of Pan
& Tompkins ECG
ECG QRS deteti-
ion algorithm, and
they are controll-
ed by a central
hardwired unit.
High Low No No
- Only the Pan & Tomkins
algorithm can run on
this proposed ASIC
hardware (very low
flexibility).
Alem-
zadeh
et al.
[62]
ECG
ABP
HR
Mean,
variance,
and corr-
elation
analysis
of the
signals
Coarse-grained
processing eleme-
nts are designed,
that can be confi-
gured to perform
mean, variance,
and correlation
analysis. A maj-
ority voter is used
to fuse the alarms
from different
signal analyses.
High
Med.
Low
Yes No
- The applied majority
voting scheme is not
robust to signal noise.
If two signals out of the
three are noisy and
generate false alarms,
even if the third signal
is good, false system
alarm would be
generated, because the
applied majority voting
does not consider signal
qualities.
RR-
HMS
ECG
ABP
Robust
heart
rate
esti-
mation
Coarse-grained
functional units
(FUs) are desig-
ned, which can be
configured to swi-
tch between ECG
and ABP analysis,
as well as for
patient-specific
monitoring.
Weighted sum is
used to fuse diff-
erent signal analy-
ses, where signal
qualities are
considered.
High Med. Yes Yes
- The efficiency is high,
because FUs are coarse
grained with application-
specific ASIC hardware
optimizations.
- The flexibility is medi-
um, as it can efficiently
support the applications
that are able to use
the designed FUs.
- Hardware fault tolerance
is designed with low area
and power overheads,
by utilizing the
application’s invariant
property.
* Flexibility means how flexible the hardware can be in supporting biomedical applications other than the one it is
designed or optimized for.
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from different leads. In addition, Khatib et al. [16] show that DSP has
both higher runtime performance and lower energy consumption than ARM
when executing the same ECG peak detection algorithm. Similarly, Kim
et al. [76] build the SoC design with DSP processors for a wavelet-based
ECG peak detection algorithm developed by [81]. DSP and ARM proces-
sors are designed and optimized for general DSP and embedded applications
with the instruction-level optimizations (such as the VLIW instruction issue,
multiply-add operation, circular buffer operation, and others), so they have
high flexibility to implement a broad range of applications with relative ef-
ficiency. However, as for the specific biomedical monitoring applications or
algorithms, DSP and ARM do not offer the best performance and energy ef-
ficiency. This is especially important in portable monitoring, which requires
higher-level application-specific optimizations beyond the instruction-level
optimization.
Coarse-grained reconfigurable array (CGRA) architecture is composed of
an array of FUs that execute ALU operations based on the given opcode,
such as addition, subtraction, or multiplication. Both the FU operations
and array data path are configurable for coarse-grained operations on the
data as it flows through the data path. Novel CGRA FU and interconnec-
tion designs are proposed in [78] to enable the FU operations and data path
interconnections that are useful to efficiently support the DSP operations
commonly used in the biomedical signal processing, such as fir filter, matrix
multiplication, FFT, and others. In [79], the Samsung reconfigurable proces-
sor (with CGRA architecture) is used for low-power biomedical applications,
and three operation modes are designed that can be dynamically switched
between each other according to the runtime application needs and require-
ments. The three modes are: CGRA low- and high-performance modes for
CGRA operations, and VLIW mode for operations that cannot be mapped
to CGRA. The CGRA designs for the biomedical monitoring target gener-
al biomedical applications by proposing the hardware architecture for the
efficient computations (such as DSP computations) that may be useful in
biomedical applications. Compared with DSP and ARM, extra data par-
allelism and efficiency can be exploited through the function operation and
data path configurations in CGRA. CGRA is flexible, but its efficiency highly
depends on the compiler techniques to map the application to the array FUs,
and frequent configurations are needed in CGRA during the application’s ex-
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ecution to change the data path for different computations, while CGRA’s
configuration is fine grained and has non-negligible configuration overheads
(both ALU operations and data path need to be configured). In addition,
many heart beat detection algorithms [18, 20, 28] are control intensive by ap-
plying thresholds, instead of data intensive, which CGRA cannot efficiently
support.
To achieve higher performance and energy efficiency for specific biomedical
applications, FPGA platforms are applied by [24, 25, 80]. Specialized hard-
ware modules for wavelet-based ECG QRS detection algorithms are built in
[24, 25] and implemented on FPGA for the efficient processing of wavelet
decomposition and transformation. The ECG beat detection and classifica-
tion algorithms are partitioned in [80] on the FPGA board, where hardware
modules are implemented in FPGA logics for efficient beat detection. Here
the embedded PowerPC processor on the FPGA board is used to classify
the detected beat as normal or premature ventricular contractions. These
FPGA-based systems achieve high efficiency due to the application-specific
hardware optimization, but they have low flexibility because the optimized
hardware modules are used only for the specific optimized application and
cannot be used by other biomedical monitoring applications. In addition, the
above FPGA-based systems only use the FPGA capability to optimize the
previously developed ECG beat detection algorithms. They do not consider
the case when the quality of the single signal being monitored is low, nor do
they use algorithm optimizations for hardware efficiency.
The application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) provides the highest per-
formance and energy efficiency because the specialized hardware modules in
ASIC are directly implemented with logic gates, instead of being kept in look-
up tables, as in FPGA. Pavlatos et al. [23] implement the Pan & Tompkins
ECG QRS detection algorithm with ASIC hardware blocks, where each block
is responsible for a different stage of the algorithm, and the blocks are con-
trolled and scheduled by a hardwired ASIC control unit. As a result, Pavlatos
et al. [23] achieve very high efficiency but low flexibility. It cannot support
any other biomedical applications, even though some of the algorithm stages
in other applications could potentially use some ASIC blocks in [23]. In
[62], coarse-grained processing elements that can be configured to perform
mean, variance, and correlation analysis are designed. The only biomedical
monitoring hardware work we found that considers multi-signal analysis and
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fusion is [62]. In [62], ECG, ABP, and heart rate (HR) signals are analyzed
in the proposed ASIC processing element, and each signal would raise a local
alarm if the corresponding analysis detects a problem. The system alarm is
raised through majority voting when two or more of the three signals raise
local alarms at the same time. However, the applied majority voting mecha-
nism is not always robust to signal noise. If two signals are noisy and cause
false local alarms, the false system alarm is generated.
In addition to the work mentioned in Table 2.4, other biomedical monitor-
ing research [82, 83, 84, 85] focuses on signal data acquisition and transmis-
sion instead of processing and analysis.
The proposed RRHMS focuses on biomedical signal processing and anal-
ysis. It estimates heart rates with multi-signal analysis and fusion. Heart
rates are extracted from both ABP and ECG signals, and the final heart rate
is obtained by the weighted sum of the two heart rates, where the weights
are calculated based on the signal qualities. As a result, RRHMS is more
robust to signal noise than the majority voting used in [62] because signal
qualities are considered. Coarse-grained ASIC FUs in RRHMS are designed
and optimized for high performance and energy efficiency to achieve long bat-
tery life. Each FU is responsible for a processing step (stage) of the RRHMS
heart rate monitoring algorithm. But unlike the previous work, RRHMS uses
algorithmic optimizations to merge the separate ABP and ECG processing
steps into shared steps. This allows shared FUs to reduce the hardware area
for portable monitoring. Also, RRHMS FUs are controlled and scheduled
by a lightweight MIPS processor through the C program with intrinsic func-
tions to invoke FU executions. Therefore, RRHMS is more flexible than the
hardwired controller used in [23]. In addition, none of the previous biomed-
ical hardware work has considered hardware fault tolerance. Even though
general fault tolerance techniques have been proposed in CGRA and FPGA
platforms (introduced in the next section), they usually incur large over-
heads. In contrast, RRHMS uses its FU design and application invariants to
achieve low-overhead fault tolerance.
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2.4 Hardware Fault Tolerance
Since none of the previous biomedical monitoring hardware works has con-
sidered fault tolerance for the processing of biomedical signals, traditional
hardware fault tolerance techniques for embedded systems are introduced in
this section. These techniques motivate the proposed RRHMS fault tolerance
design.
Fault tolerance techniques may exploit redundancy in space (hardware) or
in time. Double modular redundancy (DMR) and triple modular redundancy
(TMR) are traditional hardware redundancy techniques. They are largely
used in embedded hardware designs with ASIC, FPGA, and CGRA [86, 87,
88, 89, 90, 91]. DMR dispatches the same computation to two copies of the
hardware and compares the results to detect faults. Similarly, TMR sends
computations to three copies of the hardware and compares their results. If
the results of the duplicated computations do not match, the fault is detected.
In DMR, since it does not know which one of the two executions is faulty, re-
execution is needed to recover from the fault [86]. If the fault is transient and
does not happen again in re-execution, the two results in re-execution would
match and the application proceeds. But if the fault continuously occurs or is
permanent, DMR can detect it but not fix it. In TMR, if the fault happens in
a single hardware copy while the results of the other two match, the majority
voter directly masks the fault without stalling the application (such as by
re-execution). If the fault is permanent, TMR can be downgraded into DMR
for operations and thus mask the single permanent fault [89].
However, DMR and TMR normally introduce large hardware area and
power overheads due to the additional hardware copies and executions. Tech-
niques [89, 90, 91, 92] have been proposed to reduce the hardware area over-
heads in applying TMR in CGRA and FPGA platforms. However, if the idle
resources (spare FUs in CGRA or configuration logic blocks in FPGA) are
used, the large power overhead caused by duplicate executions still exists.
In addition, the techniques proposed in [93, 94, 95] use the spare resources
for data path reconfiguration in FPGA and CGRA to circumvent the logics
with permanent faults.
Time redundancy techniques [96, 97, 98, 99, 100] are used to tolerate tran-
sient faults while saving overhead in both hardware area and power. They
take advantage of the temporal nature of transient faults. Unlike TMR, which
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detects and recovers (masks) the fault at the same time, time redundancy
techniques usually separate the detection and recovery processes. DMR can
be seen as a costly time redundancy technique, as used in [86], where the
fault is detected by comparing the results of the DMR processors. On de-
tection of the fault, the two processors are rolled back and re-executed for
recovery. This apporach is simple in terms of design (just duplicating the
hardware modules), but it incurs large hardware area and power overheads.
To reduce the overheads in fault detection, [96, 97] proposed a self-checking
scheme to distinguish correct and incorrect output values based on the pre-
served output states. In addition, Jafri et al. [98] use the technique of residue
code modulo 3 for low overhead fault detection in the fine-grained arithmetic
operations, such as addition and subtraction, by exploiting the modulo 3 re-
lationship between the inputs and outputs. After the fault is detected, time
redundancy techniques usually apply re-execution for recovery. Depending
on the fault detection delay and hardware implementation, there are three
kinds of re-execution [99]:
(1) Retry : the faulty instruction(s) are directly re-executed if the inputs
have not been changed or overwritten.
(2) Checkpoint and roll-back : the system state of the previous checkpoint
is restored before re-execution (the checkpoint is needed if the input
states may be modified before the fault is detected).
(3) Restart : the system needs to be restarted and the whole application
re-executed if the fault is detected too late and cannot be recovered
through partial application re-execution.
Retry has been applied in [98, 99] to commit the instructions only when no
fault is detected during the execution. The checkpoint and roll-back scheme
have been applied in [86, 100], and to derive the optimal checkpointing inter-
val, Li and Jiang [86] analytically modeled the system. Restart is used when
the fault detection is not effective enough, and it is usually not acceptable in
real-time embedded systems, such as the proposed RRHMS.
Therefore, compared with hardware redundancy, such as TMR, time re-
dundancy techniques trade off performance (especially when re-execution is
needed) for hardware area and power. We focus on tolerance of transient
faults and apply time redundancy for low-overhead fault tolerance design.
This is because hardware area and power are crucial for the portability and
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battery life of the monitoring system. Additionally, thanks to the RRHMS
FU design and optimization, the RRHMS hardware system’s performance
easily meets the real-time performance constraint. During normal monitor-
ing without fault, the proposed fault tolerance mechanism does not introduce
any performance overhead.
Since traditional fault detection techniques, such as the above introduced
ones, try to detect fault in the operations of general applications, they still
incur large overheads, though some of them are smaller than the overheads
of DMR and TMR. RRHMS exploits application-specific properties to de-
tect faults at low overheads. The following properties of RRHMS are used
to achieve this low overhead: (1) coarse-grained FU design, and (2) the
application-specific invariant property [26]. Since RRHMS FUs are coarse
grained and represent high-level application processing steps, the concept of
software invariants proposed in [26] is applicable to the FU outputs. FU
output invariants are patient-specific, obtained by application profiling using
the patient data. The FU invariants are checked in parallel with normal FU
executions and therefore do not introduce performance overhead. An FU
finishes the execution only if no fault is detected, otherwise retry is applied
to re-execute the FU for transient fault recovery. No extra checkpoint and
roll-back schemes are needed in RRHMS, because the inputs of an FU can-
not be modified before the completion of its execution (its input states are
inherently checkpointed). Similar to the traditional time redundancy tech-
niques, RRHMS only recovers transient faults, even though both transient
and permanent faults can be detected.
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Chapter 3
RRHMS HEART RATE ALGORITHM
In this chapter, the robust heart rate detection algorithm used in RRHMS
is introduced. The overview of the algorithm is given first, followed by the
detailed explanations of each step in the algorithm, including peak detection,
signal quality evaluation, and heart rate estimation and fusion. In the end,
the shared processing steps enabled by the algorithmic optimizations are
described and discussed.
3.1 Algorithm Overview
The robust heart rate is obtained by analyzing both ABP and ECG signals.
Algorithmic-level optimizations have been applied to allow shared processing
steps between the two signals. Figure 3.1 shows the overall heart rate detec-
tion flow, with shared processing steps in grey boxes. There are two main
Figure 3.1: Robust heart rate detection flow
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stages in the heart rate detection flow:
(1) peak detection on the raw ABP and ECG signals, which includes signal
preprocessing to remove signal noises and highlight approximate peak
locations, as well as the threshold-based peak identification, and
(2) heart rate estimation on each signal and fusion of the two heart rates
by a weighted voter (weighted sum) that uses the signal qualities.
Both ABP and ECG signals are collected and analyzed based on 10 s win-
dows. For each 10 s period, the newly collected signals are input to this flow
to estimate an average heart rate. This chapter introduces in detail each
processing step in this heart rate detection flow.
3.2 Peak Detection
Peak detection of both signals starts with a low-pass filter (LPF) to remove
high-frequency noises. The LPFs are slightly different for ABP and ECG
signals, as they have different natural frequencies in the peaks and surround-
ing noise interference. We designed the LPFs to be lightweight and easy for
computation in an energy efficient portable hardware of the RRHMS, fol-
lowing the fast digital filter design proposed in [8]. The two LPFs for our
ABP and ECG signals at 125 Hz sampling frequency are described by the
following formulas:
for ABP: yn = (xn + 2xn−1 + xn−2)/4
for ECG: yn = (xn + 2xn−1 + 3xn−2 + 2xn−3 + xn−4)/9
Since the two LPFs have the same computation structure with different pa-
rameters, they can share the hardware computation block with muxes to
select parameters.
After the low-pass filter, ECG needs two more steps than ABP does, deriva-
tive and squaring. This is because ECG tends to have more low-frequency
noise, such as the baseline wonder noise. The derivative is used to differen-
tiate the ECG QRS slope information from the low-frequency noise, and the
squaring further emphasizes the higher frequency peaks of ECG. These two
steps are part of the ECG preprocessing in the Pan & Tompkins ECG peak
detection algorithm [18] to preprocess the ECG signal and highlight its peak
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locations.
Next, slope sum is applied on both signals to enhance and smooth the
rising portion of the signal for the benefit of the later threshold-based peak
detection step. Slope sum was originally used only for the preprocessing of
the ABP signal in [20]. However, we found it has similar (sometime even
better) effects as the moving-window integration step in the Pan & Tomp-
kins algorithm. Therefore, we applied slope sum for ECG analysis as the
replacement for the moving-window integration. Thus, these two originally
separate ABP and ECG processing steps are merged into a single step based
on their algorithmic purpose. Slope sum is defined in [20] as
SSF (k) =
k∑
i=k−w
∆yi, b =
∆xi, if ∆xi > 00, if ∆xi ≤ 0
where k is the current sample index and w is the slope sum window (w should
be set as the duration of the signals rising portion). We chose w = 15 (120
ms) for ABP and w = 10 (80 ms) for ECG because ECG has sharper peaks
and rises faster than ABP.
After the slope sum, a threshold-based peak detection technique is applied
to locate the peaks of the two signals. We developed a peak detection tech-
nique that works for both ABP and ECG signals by combining and modifying
two previously developed methods for ABP and ECG: threshold-based ABP
onset detection [28] and Pan Tompkins threshold-based ECG peak detection
[18]. Both of these are among the most popular beat detection methods for
ABP and ECG signals, respectively. After the modification, our peak de-
tection method consists of three steps, summarized by the pseudo codes in
Algorithm 1. First, detect onset of the slope summed signal by checking a
threshold value (Thonset) against each slope sum data point. When Thonset
is crossed by a data point, the local search is applied around this point to
find the local maximum (slope sum peak) and minimum values. The local
searching diameter is half of the estimated peak-to-peak interval (Test), cen-
tered at the threshold crossing point. Second, check the difference between
the local maximum and minimum values, which are found by local searching.
If their difference exceeds another threshold (Thdiff ), the slope sum peak is
accepted. Then, back searching is applied in the original signal around the
slope sum’s peak location to detect the peak in the original signal (ABP or
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Algorithm 1 Threshold-Based Peak Detection
1: procedure PeakDetection(slope, originSig)
2: i← 0
3: while i < size of slope (slope summed signal) do
4: step 1: detect onset of the slope summed signal
5: if slope[i] > thonset then
6: // local search for max. and min. in the slope summed signal
7: [slopemax, slopemin]← local search value(slope, i, 12Test);
8: // eye closing for half window
9: i← i+ floor(1
2
∗ Test);
10: step 2: check difference and back search for peak
11: if slopemax − slopemin > Thdiff then
12: // back search in original signal if the peak is accepted
13: peakidx ← local search index(originSig, i, 14Test);
14: // eye closing for another half window
15: i← i+ floor(1
2
∗ Test);
16: step 3: update parameters if the peak accepted
17: if peakidx > last peakidx then
18: insert peak (peakidx);
19: // calculate new parameter values of the detected peak
20: new thonset ← 12slopemax
21: new thdiff ← 12(slopemax − slopemin)
22: new Test ← peakidx − last peakidx
23: // update using weighted sum with the above new values
24: thonset ← 78 ∗ thonset + 18 ∗ new thonset
25: thdiff ← 78 ∗ thdiff + 18 ∗ new thdiff
26: Test ← 78 ∗ Test + 18 ∗ new Test
27: i← i+ 1
ECG) and its location index. The back searching diameter is a quarter of
Test. Back searching has a smaller diameter than local searching for the peaks
in the slope summed signal. This is because the peak location of the orig-
inal signal is close to the corresponding peak location of the slope summed
signal. A quarter of Test is chosen based on experiments with different pa-
tient data from the MIMIC II database. At last, check whether the location
index of the newly detected peak in the original signal is greater than that
of the previously detected peak. This check makes sure that a peak is not
detected twice. It is possible that two consecutive peaks may occur within
an interval less than a quarter of Test, such as when the patient starts to have
tachycardia. If this check is passed (the newly detected peak is not the dou-
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ble detection of an old peak), the new peak is recorded as one of the signal
peaks to be output from this peak detection step. Additionally, the three
parameters (Thonset, Thdiff , and Test) are updated with the new parameter
values calculated from the newly detected peak, as shown in the pseudo code.
This update is used for the dynamic adaption to normal signal changes (e.g.,
the normal heart rate of the same patient may be different in the morning
and in the evening with gradual changes). Weighted sum is applied as the
function for updates. Seven-eighths weight is put on the old parameter value
and only one-eighth is put on the new value, so that even if the new value
is not correct (as when the peak is incorrectly detected from a noisy signal),
it does not corrupt the parameters. This is important, because only correct
parameters (Thonset, Thdiff , and Test) enable correct peak detection.
(a) ABP peak detection
(b) ECG peak detection
Figure 3.2: Output of each processing step of peak detection
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The initial values of the three parameters (Thonset, Thdiff , and Test) are
trained using the first 20 windows of the patient’s data. Thonset is initialized
to be twice the mean slope sum value in the training period, and Test is the
mean peak-to-peak interval. Thdiff is initialized to be half of the average
of the maximum and minimum slope sum differences in the entire training
period.
Figure 3.2 shows the output of each peak detection processing step for a
window of ABP and ECG signals (1250 samples at 125 Hz sampling frequen-
cy). From the figure, we can see that all peaks are correctly detected for
both ABP and ECG signals.
3.3 Signal Quality Evaluation
Signal qualities of the two signals are evaluated and used for the heart rate
fusion. The signal qualities are evaluated on the basis of detected beats. ABP
signal quality is obtained by combining two previously proposed methods:
fuzzy signal quality assessment [20] and signal abnormality assessment [9].
Both methods assign a signal quality value to each detected beat. Fuzzy
assessment assigns a fuzzy quality value between 0 and 1 to each beat (the
higher the value is, the better quality the beat has). The definition of the
fuzzy function is as follow:
fuzzy(x, a, b) =

0, if x ≤ a
2 ∗ (x− a
b− a
)2
, if a < x ≤ a+ b
2
1− 2 ∗ (x− a
b− a
)2
, if
a+ b
2
< x ≤ b
1, if b < x
Figure 3.3 illustrates the shape of the fuzzy function output. Instead of
only output 0 or 1 (binary values), the fuzzy function defines a range ([a, b])
where the output is continuous between 0 and 1. Therefore, instead of only
classifying a beat as good or bad, the fuzzy function allows the beat quality
value to be in between, such as 30% good.
To compute the fuzzy quality, a set of features is extracted from each ABP
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Figure 3.3: Shape of the fuzzy function output [20]
beat: systolic blood pressure (ABP peak value), diastolic blood pressure
(ABP valley value), maximum positive blood pressure slope, maximum neg-
ative blood pressure slope, maximum up-slope duration, pulse blood pressure
(difference between systolic and diastolic blood pressures), and peak-to-peak
interval. Each feature value is used as the input (parameter x) to a fuzzy
function, and the other two fuzzy function inputs (parameter a and b) are
either pre-set thresholds or trained base model values. Therefore, a set of
fuzzy quality values is computed based on the beat features, and each fuzzy
quality computed represents the beat quality in a different aspect. Table 3.1
Table 3.1: Fuzzy functions and their representations of beat quality [20]
Variable
Name Representation and Definition Parameter Explanation
ATL ABP amplitude too large: SBP : systolic BP, mmHg;
µATL = fuzzy(SBP − SBPa; 20, 60) SBPa: systolic BP base
ATS ABP amplitude too small: DBP : diastolic BP, mmHg
µATS = 1− fuzzy(DBP ; 0, 20)
STL ABP slope too large: MPPS: maximum positive
µSTL = fuzzy(MPPS/MPPSa; 1, 3) BP slope; MPPSa: MPPS base
STS ABP slope too small: MNPS: maximum negative
µSTS = fuzzy(MNPS/MNPSa; 1, 3) PB slope; MNPSa: MNPS base
KRTL ABP keeps rising too long MUSD: maximum up-slope
µKRTL = fuzzy(MUSD; 200, 500) duration, ms
SHTL ABP stays high too long MDAT : maximum duration
µSHTL = fuzzy(MDAT ; 400, 800) above threshold, ms
PPD ABP pulse pressure decrease PBP: pulse blood pressure;
µPPD = 1− fuzzy(PBP/PBPa; 0.5, 0.9) PBPa: PBP base
DBPI ABP diastolic pressure increase DBP : diastolic blood pressure:
µDBPI = fuzzy(DBP/DBPa; 0.8, 1.1) DBPa: DBP base
PrP Premature ABP pulse: T : pulse-pulse interval;
µPrP = 1− fuzzy(T/Ta; 0.75, 0.95) Ta: T base
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lists all the fuzzy functions we used (similar to Table 1 in [20]), along with
their representations for the beat quality. The base model values listed in the
parameter explanation column of the table are trained as the average value
of the corresponding features. Similar to the parameters in the threshold-
based peak detection step (Thonset, Thdiff , and Test), the first 20 windows
of patient data are used to train the base model values as well, and the base
model values are updated with the weighted sum function:
V = 0.875 ∗ V + 0.125 ∗ Vnew
where V on the right of the equal sign is the previous base model value and
V on the left of the equal sign is the updated base model value. Vnew is the
feature value extracted from the current beat. The base model values are up-
dated only if the beat is not classified as abnormal by the signal abnormality
assessment (introduced later).
With all of the fuzzy values (in Table 3.1) computed from each beat fea-
ture, three composite quality values are defined by using fuzzy conditional
statements: ABP amplitude normal, ABP slope normal, and ABP with
blocked transducer. The composite quality values are the intermediate val-
ues used to derive the final beat quality. The following definitions to compute
the composite values and final fuzzy quality value are from [20]. We used
the same method as in [20] to derive the final fuzzy quality for the beat in
RRHMS. ABP amplitude normal is defined as:
IF [not ABP amplitude too large (ATL)] and
[not ABP amplitude too small (ATS)]
THEN ABP amplitude normal (AN)
µAN = (1− µATL) ∧ (1− µATS)
where ∧ stands for fuzzy intersection and is defined as µA∧µB = min[µA, µB].
Similarly, the other two composite quality values are computed as follows:
IF [not ABP slope too large (STL)] and
[not ABP slope too small (STS)]
THEN ABP slope normal (SN)
µSN = (1− µSTL) ∧ (1− µSTS)
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IF [ ABP pulse pressure decrease (PPD)] and
[ ABP diastolic pressure increase (DBPI)] and
[not premature ABP pulse (PrP)]
THEN ABP with blocked transducer (WBT)
µWBT = µPPD ∧ µDBPI ∧ (1− µPrp)
In the end, the final fuzzy quality of the beat is defined as:
IF [ ABP amplitude normal (AN)] and
[ ABP slope normal (SN)] and
[not ABP keeps rising too long (KRTL)] and
[not ABP stays high too long (SHTL)] and
[not ABP with blocked transducer (WBT)]
THEN ABP signal quality good (SQG)
µSQG = µAN ∧ µSN ∧ (1− µKRTL)
∧ (1− µSHTL) ∧ (1− µWBT )
On the other hand, the signal abnormality assessment of ABP gives a
binary value, 0 or 1, to each beat (0 means normal beat, 1 means abnormal
beat). The beat is classified as normal or abnormal by checking the features
extracted from the beat with the pre-set thresholds. Table 3.2 lists the
abnormality criteria used in [9]. The listed thresholds are chosen to be the
Table 3.2: Criteria for abnormal beat detection [9]
Abnormality
Feature Description Criteria
SBP systolic blood pressure SBP > 300 mmHg
DBP diastolic pressure DBP < 20 mmHg
MBP mean blood pressure MBP < 30 or
MBP > 200 mmHg
HR heart rate HR < 20 or
HR > 200 bpm
PBP pulse blood pressure PBP < 20 mmHg
w mean negative slopes w < –40 mmHg/100 ms
SBP [k]− SBP [k − 1] systolic BP difference |∆SBP | > 20 mmHg
DBP [k]−DBP [k − 1] diastolic BP difference |∆DBP | > 20 mmHg
T [k]− T [k − 1] peak interval difference |∆T | > 2/3 s
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physiological limits of human beings. For example, the systolic blood pressure
never exceeds 300 mmHg and diastolic blood pressure never drops below 20
mmHg. So if any criterion is violated, it means the detected beat is abnormal.
We modified the abnormality criteria in RRHMS. Instead of using the pre-
set thresholds, we use the trained base models for each of the features listed
in Table 3.2 except the last three difference features. Table 3.3 shows the
modified criteria used in RRHMS, where Xa means the base model value
of feature X (similar to the notation used in Table 3.1). Since most of the
features used in abnormality detection are also used in the fuzzy signal quality
assessment discussed above, the training and updating of the base models
for abnormality detection can share the computations in the fuzzy quality
assessment and therefore not add much computation complexity. We replace
each upper limit threshold with twice the corresponding trained base model
value and replace the lower limit threshold with half of the corresponding
trained base model value, making our modified criteria are more patient-
specific. The criteria for the last three difference features are not modified,
because they are very sensitive to the data in the training period. If during
the training period, the patient’s ABP waveform does not change much, then
the difference features are close to 0. As a result, during the monitoring, a
small change in the ABP waveform (even within normal physiological range)
may cause violations in the criteria of the difference features. So we used
the same pre-set thresholds as in [9] for those three difference features. The
other features do not have this problem because they are not affected by the
Table 3.3: Modified criteria for abnormal beat detection used in RRHMS
Abnormality
Feature Description Criteria
SBP systolic blood pressure SBP > 2∗SBPa
DBP diastolic pressure DBP < 0.5∗DBPa
MBP mean blood pressure MBP < 0.5∗MBPa or
MBP > 2∗MBPa
HR heart rate HR < 0.5∗HRa or
HR > 2∗HRa
PBP pulse blood pressure PBP < 0.5∗PBPa
w mean negative slopes w < 2∗wa
SBP [k]− SBP [k − 1] systolic BP difference |∆SBP | > 20 mmHg
DBP [k]−DBP [k − 1] diastolic BP difference |∆DBP | > 20 mmHg
T [k]− T [k − 1] peak interval difference |∆T | > 2/3 s
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changes in the training period. For example, if the average systolic blood
pressure of a patient in the training period is 120 mmHg, a newly detected
systolic blood pressure of more than 240 mmHg or less than 60 mmHg is
always an indicator of abnormality. As mentioned above, all the base model
values are updated only if the beat is classified as normal (i.e., if no criteria
are violated).
From the two signal quality values (fuzzy signal quality and signal abnor-
mality), the overall quality of each beat is calculated as follows: if the beat
is evaluated as normal (abnormality value is 0), the fuzzy quality value is di-
rectly used as the beat quality. Otherwise, the fuzzy quality value multiplied
by 0.7 is used as the beat quality. At last, the overall ABP signal quality
for the window, SQABP , is judged by the qualities of all the detected beats
within this window. If there is no beat detected in the window, it means
either the patient is having the asystole problem or the sensor is disconnect-
ed (sensor disconnection is not a rare problem in the MIMIC II database).
For either case, we assign the window signal quality to 0. If both ABP and
ECG window signal qualities are zero for either reason, a flag will be raised
in the heart rate fusion step that fuses the heart rate based on both signal
qualities. This is the best we can do because currently we have no way to
differentiate asystole and sensor disconnection. The ABP signal quality of
the window is defined as the percentage of the detected beats whose quality
is beyond a threshold (SQ TH):
SQABP =
1
N
N−1∑
i=0
1{xi>SQ TH}
where 1{cond} is an indicator function, which outputs 1 if cond is evaluated to
be true, otherwise 0. N is the total number of beats detected in this window,
and xi is the final fuzzy quality of the ith beat. SQ TH is set to be 0.5 in our
implementation, which is also the value used in [20] to indicate good quality
ABP beat.
Similarly, the kurtosis value is computed for each detected ECG beat to
evaluate the beat quality. Kurtosis is the fourth standardized moment, de-
fined by the formula
kurtosis =
E[(X − µ)4]
(E[(X − µ)2])2 =
µ4
σ4
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where µ is the mean value of the array (raw ECG data values) and σ is the
standard deviation. The kurtosis value of an ECG beat is computed using
two periods around the current beat (from the previous detected beat to the
next detected beat). Low kurtosis value indicates low-frequency noise in the
ECG signal [70]. Therefore, the final ECG signal quality of the window,
SQECG, is defined as the percentage of the beats whose kurtosis value is
above a threshold. The same formula used to compute the final ABP signal
quality can be also used for computation of the final ECG signal quality,
where xi in this case stands for the kurtosis value of the ith ECG beat, and
SQ TH is set to 5 to differentiate the good and noisy ECG beats, according
to [70].
3.4 Heart Rate Estimation and Fusion
After peak detection, the average heart rate is calculated from each signal
using the formula
HR =
60
N
N∑
i=1
Ti (beats/min)
where Ti is the peak to peak interval (in seconds) between the ith and (i−1)th
peak. Then, the Kalman filter is applied to remove high-frequency noise in
the heart rate estimations between the signal windows [21].
In the end, the Kalman-filtered heart rates from the two signals (HRABP
and HRECG) are weighted to obtain the final heart rate estimation for this
window. Weights are calculated based on four parameters: ABP and ECG
signal qualities (SQABP and SQECG) and their Kalman residuals obtained
from the Kalman filtering process (rABP and rECG). Similar to [21], the
weights and final weighted heart rate are calculated by
weighted HR =
ω2
ω1 + ω2
∗HRABP + ω1
ω1 + ω2
∗HRECG
where, ω1 = (
rABP
SQABP
)2 and ω2 = (
rECG
SQECG
)2
Interested readers can refer to [21] for more details on weighted heart rate
estimation using the Kalman filter and signal qualities. Figure 3.4 and Figure
3.5 show two examples of the Kalman filtered heart rate and final weighted
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heart rate for 500 windows of ABP and ECG data, collected from the MIMIC
II database (patient number a41709 and a41178, respectively). In both ex-
amples, we see that the Kalman filter is able to remove high-frequency noise
and smooth the heart rate estimations between windows. In Figure 3.4, at
around window 128, the ABP signal is corrupted by large artifacts and noise,
so no peaks are detected and the signal quality is low. Similarly, the ECG
signal is corrupted around window 187. These two segments are cases where
one signal is corrupted while the other signal is good. The same scenario
happens in Figure 3.5 at around window 50 as well, where ECG is corrupted
while ABP is good. In the end, the weighted sum voter fixes these problems,
by weighting less on the low-quality signals at the corresponding segments,
and therefore it enables accurate and continuous heart rate monitoring.
3.5 Shared Processing
As highlighted in the gray boxes of Figure 3.1, most of the processing steps
are shared for ABP and ECG analyses. The shared processing steps have the
same computations but with different parameters for ABP and ECG signals
(e.g., w value in slope sum, Thonset, Thdiff , Test values in peak detection,
etc.). In addition, some parameters are different for different patients, such
as the base model values in the ABP signal quality assessment. The shar-
ing allows shared hardware modules for performance- and energy-efficient
computation within a tight area constraint. The signal- and patient-specific
parameters can be passed to the hardware modules through configuration
registers in the module. Therefore, within only a few cycles, a module is able
to be configured to switch between ABP and ECG computations, as well as
between different patients. The fast configuration reduces the overhead of
shared hardware modules for the computations of different biomedical signals
and enables fast overall processing speed, which allows frequency scaling to
reduce the average power consumption. More details of the hardware design
are introduced in the following section (Chapter 4).
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(a) Kalman filtered ABP heart rates
(b) Kalman filtered ECG rates
(c) Weighted heart rate
Figure 3.4: Kalman filtered ABP and ECG heart rates for 500 windows,
and final weighted heart rates of the corresponding windows (data from the
MIMIC II database patient a41709)
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(a) Kalman filtered ABP heart rates
(b) Kalman filtered ECG rates
(c) Weighted heart rate
Figure 3.5: Kalman filtered ABP and ECG heart rates for 500 windows,
and final weighted heart rates of the corresponding windows (data from the
MIMIC II database patient a41178)
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Chapter 4
RRHMS HARDWARE SYSTEM
This chapter introduces the baseline design of the RRHMS hardware system
without fault tolerance features (fault tolerance is introduced in Chapter 5).
It begins with an overview of the hardware architecture, followed by the
detailed description of the configurable FU design. The FUs are configured
and controlled by a central MIPS controller, which is discussed after FU
design. We conclude by explaining the mapping and implementation of the
robust heart rate estimation algorithm (introduced in Chapter 3) for the
proposed hardware system.
4.1 Hardware System Overview
The proposed hardware system consists of three main parts, as shown in
Figure 4.1: (1) an FU ASIC accelerator composed of a set of configurable
FUs, (2) a lightweight MIPS controller, and (3) a shared on-chip memory
system.
The FUs efficiently execute the processing steps of the robust heart rate
estimation algorithm (processing steps are summarized in Figure 3.1). There-
fore, the FUs are coarse grained, and ASIC optimizations can be applied to
each FU at a large computation scope to achieve high performance and en-
ergy efficiency. As mentioned in Section 3.5, the FUs are designed by taking
advantage of the algorithmic optimizations, where the separate processing
steps of ABP and ECG signals are shared. As a result, most FUs are re-
sponsible for both ABP and ECG computations. Different parameters used
in ABP and ECG computations are passed to the FUs through the configu-
ration registers inside them.
The FUs are controlled by a lightweight MIPS controller, which is modified
from a 16-bit open source MIPS processor downloaded from the OpenCores
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Figure 4.1: RRHMS hardware system overview
Community [101]. Two instructions are extended from the MIPS baseline
instruction set to configure and execute the FUs. The two instructions are
sent from the MIPS controller to the corresponding FUs through the system
coordination and configuration bus, as illustrated by Figure 4.1 (lower right
part). The MIPS controller is also responsible for other computations that
are not supported by the coarse-grained FUs, such as control flows.
The shared on-chip memory is used for three purposes: (1) general memory
for FUs and MIPS controller to store and load computation data, (2) commu-
nication channel for FUs and MIPS controller to pass data and computation
results to each other, and (3) interface to collect the input biomedical signals
and output the computed heart rate. To support real-time processing, the
input signals are stored in a double buffer. When a window of signal data
is ready, the MIPS controller is notified to start the processing of this win-
dow. At the same time, the next window of incoming signal data is stored
in the other half of the double buffer through direct memory access. In this
way, processing is not interrupted by the incoming data, and if the hardware
fault is detected, the current window can be re-processed for transient fault
recovery (discussed in Chapter 5), since the current window’s data have not
been overwritten by new data.
All FUs are designed following the same template and have the same in-
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terfaces (connected to system bus and memory). The only difference is the
computations they support. Therefore, it is easy to remove and add FU
components to modify the proposed hardware system for other embedded
applications. In this sense, not only can the proposed hardware system be
used in RRHMS to efficiently run the robust heart rate detection application,
it can also be used as a framework for embedded hardware designs.
In RRHMS, the proposed hardware system runs the robust heart rate
detection algorithm discussed in Chapter 3. As depicted in Figure 4.1 (left
part), the inputs to the hardware system are raw ABP and ECG signals
collected from the bio-sensors, and they are stored in the dedicated memory
locations (double buffer). The output is the weighted heart rate estimation
obtained from the analysis of the ABP and ECG signals. The output is also
stored in the dedicated memory location so that other systems can read it
from the RRHMS to make sure of the heart rate information, such as the
heart rate variability analysis system.
4.2 Functional Unit Design and Configuration
Functional units (FUs) are a set of coarse-grained accelerators to support
efficient ABP and ECG processing. Each processing step shown in Figure
3.1 has a corresponding FU implementation. With the computation sharing
enabled by the algorithmic optimization, there are a total of 11 FUs needed
for our heart rate detection algorithm. (FU numbers are listed next to the
corresponding processing steps in Figure 3.1). All FUs are designed to have
the same interface and follow the same design template as depicted in Figure
4.2. Each FU is composed of three parts: (1) interfaces (bus and memory
interface), (2) configuration registers (CRs), and (3) computation logics (data
path and state machine controller).
The FU bus interface connects to the system coordination and configu-
ration bus (between MIPS controller and ASIC accelerator). It monitors
the configuration and execution instructions sent from the MIPS controller.
Upon receiving a configuration instruction corresponding to its FU, the bus
interface reads the instruction from the bus, parses the configuration param-
eters, and configures the CR in its FU as specified by the instruction. When
the execution instruction is received, the bus interface notifies the FU com-
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Figure 4.2: Template of functional unit design
putation logics to start execution. When the computation logics finish the
FU execution, the bus interface sends a DONE signal with its FU number
to the coordination and configuration bus to let the MIPS controller know
about its completion. FU memory interface, on the other side, is responsible
for reading and writing data from and to the on-chip memory shared between
the MIPS controller and FU ASIC accelerator. All FU memory interfaces
connect to the memory arbiter, which is a priority selector used to schedule
memory requests from all FUs. FU priorities can be set by users to over-
write the default round robin priority setting. Similarly, FU priorities are
also used on the bus interface side to resolve contention in the DONE signals
when multiple FUs finish executions at the same time, as the lightweight
MIPS controller can handle only one DONE signal in a cycle. There is also a
priority selector for FU DONE signals, but its complexity is much less than
that of the memory arbiter. When the request of an FU, either to memory
arbiter or to DONE arbiter, is granted, the FU is notified to continue its
execution. Otherwise, the FU keeps sending the request and waiting for its
feedback. The priority and arbiter features have been implemented in the
current design but are not in use because currently the FUs are scheduled
to be executed one by one, not in parallel. For these reasons, there is no
contention for either memory requests or DONE signals. However, pipelin-
ing the FU executions is planned for future work. With pipelined execution,
multiple FUs may request memories or finish executions in the same cycle,
but the priority scheme will effectively resolve these contentions. An FU
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whose result is waited for by other FUs should be set with higher priority.
Therefore, the FU interfaces are designed for the scalability of the system,
and more FUs can be easily added.
FU configuration registers (CRs) function as the bridge for passing the
needed input parameters into the FU computation logics. The most com-
mon parameters used by FUs (listed in Figure 4.2) are: memory address to
read input data, memory address to store computation result(s), and size of
the input data to process. These parameters provide the FU with the basic
information about the input data and the way to output the result. Addition-
ally, more CRs can be added in an FU for passing other useful parameters,
such as the slope sum window size (w) in slope sum computation, threshold
and estimated period values (Thonset, Thdiff , Test) in peak detection, base
model values in ABP signal quality assessment, and others. Therefore, each
FU may have a different number of CRs (up to eight are allowed in our
implementation). If the FU needs more input parameters than are allowed,
some inputs can be grouped into a consecutive memory chunk. A CR can
then pass the starting address of the memory chunk to the FU for loading
and computation. Table 4.1 shows all the configuration registers in each of
the 11 FUs implemented in the RRHMS.
FU computation logics are made up of two parts: (1) computation data
path, and (2) state machine controller. The computation data path is FU-
specific and implements the ASIC logic of the corresponding FU computa-
tion. The state machine is the hardwired controller that
• schedules the computation in the data path,
• reads configuration registers for input parameters,
• sends memory requests through the memory interface, and
• listens to the bus interface for execution start signal and notifies the
bus interface to send the DONE signal when the execution completes.
The state machine controllers (SMCs) are similar in all FUs and follow the
same scheduling pattern. At the beginning, the SMC is in the IDLE state.
When an execution signal is sent from the MIPS controller corresponding
to its FU, the SMC is notified by the bus interface to start execution. In
the execution, SMC first switches to READMEM state, where it checks the
corresponding configuration register for the input data address and notifies
the memory interface to send the memory request to read the first input
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Table 4.1: Functional units and their configuration registers (CR)
FU
No.
FU
Name FU Description Configuration Registers
0 low-pass
filter
Remove high-
frequency noise
in ABP and ECG
signals.
CR0: address to read raw ABP/ECG signal
CR1: address to store filtered signal
CR2: signal size, last bit (0 - ECG or 1 - ABP)
1 slope sum Compute the slope
sum values according
to the slope sum fun-
ction (Section 3.2).
CR0: address to read the signal
CR1: address to store slope sum result
CR2: signal size
CR3: slope sum window size
2 peak
detection
Detect the peak
locations (or indexes)
for the input signal
(ABP or ECG) of
the current window.
CR0: address to read raw ABP/ECG signal
CR1: address to store detected peak indexes
CR2: signal size
CR3: address to read the slope summed signal
CR4: address of model parameters (Thonset, Thdiff , Test)
CR5: address to store detected peak number
CR6: address to store detected valley indexes
3 heart rate Calculate the average
heart rate of the
current window.
CR0: address to read peak locations
CR1: address to store computed heart rate
CR2: number of peaks
4 Kalman
filter
Filter the high-
frequency noise in the
heart rate estimations
between windows.
CR0: address to store filtered (estimated) heart rate
CR1: address of input parameters (posteriori value,
measured heart rate, last estimated heart rate)
CR2: address to store computed Kalman residue
5 final
signal
quality
Calculate the
percentage of high-
quality beats in the
current window.
CR0: address to read signal quality of each beat
CR1: address to store signal quality (percentage) result
CR2: number of beats
CR3: threshold for high quality beat (upper 16 bits)
CR4: threshold for high quality beat (lower 16 bits)
6 derivative Compute the
derivative value of
the input signal.
CR0: address to read the input signal
CR1: address to store the computed derivative values
CR2: signal size
7 squaring Compute the
squaring value of
the input signal.
CR0: address to read the input signal
CR1: address to store the computed squaring values
CR2: signal size
8 ABP beat
quality
Evaluate the signal
quality for a detected
ABP beat (combining
techniques developed
in [9] and [20]).
CR0: address to read ABP signal
CR1: address to store the computed beat quality
CR2: peak index for the current evaluated beat
CR3: last peak index
CR4: valley index for the current beat
CR5: next valley index
CR6: address to read base model parameters
9 ECG beat
quality
Evaluate the signal
quality for a detected
ECG beat (kurtosis
value).
CR0: address to read ECG signal (from the previous
beat peak to next beat peak)
CR1: address to store the beat quality result (computed
kurtosis value)
CR2: signal size from the previous to next beat peak
10 heart rate
(HR)
fusion
Fuse the heart rates
computed from ABP
and ECG signals (by
weighted sum).
CR0: address to load the input parameters (signal
qualities, Kalman residues, and heart rates of
both ABP and ECG signals)
CR1: address to store the fused heart rate
Note: address in the table means memory address, and CR means configuration register (16 bit).
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data. The input data come in after a cycle from the on-chip memory (Block
RAM in FPGA implementation or SRAM in ASIC implementation). After
getting the first input data, SMC jumps to the READMEM AND COMP
state to continue sending memory requests to read the following input data.
At the same time, it notifies the computation logics to process the new input
data that come in due to the memory request previously sent. Therefore, the
computations are pipelined with the memory reads. If in a cycle, no input
data come in due to the scheduling of the memory arbiter, no notification
is sent to the computation logics to process the input data, and the same
memory request is sent again. After all the input data have been read, SMC
enters WAIT COMP state to wait for the computation logics to finish the
computation. During this time, the SMC may still send different control bits
to computation logics according to the computation stage. When the compu-
tation is finished and the result(s) have been written to the memory through
the memory interface, SMC goes to WAIT DONE state. In this state, it
lets the bus interface keep sending the DONE signal until its DONE signal is
processed by the MIPS controller. After this, the SMC jumps back to IDLE
state and waits for the next round of execution. This is the general SMC
scheduling pattern followed by all the FU SMCs, and all FU computation
logics are pipelined and optimized in all FU implementations as well. The
only difference between the FUs is the specific data path computation and
number of data path stages.
Since all FUs have the same interface and follow the same design tem-
plate, the proposed hardware system can be used as a framework that can
be tailored (by adding or removing FU modules) to support other embedded
applications.
4.3 MIPS Controller
The MIPS controller is lightweight. It occupies about only 5% of the pro-
cessing area (total area except memory: FU ASIC accelerator + MIPS con-
troller). We designed the MIPS controller in the RRHMS by making the
following modifications on the 16-bit open source MIPS processor download-
ed from the OpenCores Community [101]:
• Changed the data path from 16-bit to 32-bit to allow higher precision
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of computations (instruction width is kept as 16 bit).
• Added forwarding logic to resolve the read-after-write (RAW) hazard in
fewer cycles compared with stalling the pipeline in the original design.
• Extended the baseline instruction set with two more instructions to con-
figure and execute FUs (by adding logics in the ID and MEM pipeline
stages).
The MIPS controller is responsible for: (1) configuring the FUs by sending
them configuration parameters, (2) scheduling the execution of FUs by send-
ing them execution instructions, and (3) executing the basic MIPS instruc-
tions needed between FU executions, such as the control flows and glue-logic
computations.
The FU configuration and execution instructions sent from the MIPS con-
troller are realized by extending the MIPS instruction set. Two instructions
are added to the base instruction set, as shown in Figure 4.1 (lower right
part):
(1) FU configuration (FU CFG) instruction which moves a configuration
parameter from a MIPS register (reg id) to a configuration register (fu
conf reg id) of an FU (fu id), and
(2) FU execution (FU START) instruction which notifies an FU (speci-
fied by fu id field) to start execution.
Once an FU finishes the execution and stores the results to the shared mem-
ory, the MIPS controller is notified by the FU’s bus interface, which sends a
DONE signal to the system coordination and configuration bus.
To illustrate how the two extended instructions work, Figure 4.3a shows
an example C code running on the MIPS controller. This simple example
shows how the FUs are executed from the C code. In the example, the C
code first reads a window of signal data into the signal array (1250 samples
for a 10-second window of the signal sampled at 125 Hz) and then computes
the slope sum value of the signal array and stores the slope sum result
into the slope result array. The FU executions are invoked in the C code
by intrinsic functions recognizable by the compiler. An extended version of
the MIPS C compiler can be used to generate the assembly code from C
programs. To map the C intrinsic function to the corresponding FU, the
compiler needs to maintain a table of this mapping and know the meaning of
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(a) Example C code running in the MIPS controller
(b) Assembly code of the compiled Slope Sum intrinsic function that runs on FU1
Figure 4.3: Example code running in MIPS controller
the FU configuration registers. In the example, Slope Sum is an intrinsic
function, and by looking up the intrinsic function to the FU mapping table,
the compiler finds it is mapped to FU1, which is the FU responsible for slope
sum computation. As a result, the assembly code shown in Figure 4.3b is
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generated by the compiler for the Slope Sum function. In lines 1 to 8 of
Figure 4.3b, FU1 is configured through the FU CFG instructions. In line 9,
the execution is started by the FU START instruction. During the execution,
FU1
(1) reads the data of the signal array from the memory, whose address is
specified by the configuration register 0 (CR0) of FU1,
(2) computes the slope sum values with the configured slope sum window
size specified by CR3, and
(3) writes the computed slope sum result to the result array, whose mem-
ory address is specified by CR1.
The above execution steps are pipelined inside FU1, and the total size of the
signal array data to read and process is specified by CR2.
4.4 Robust Heart Rate Application Mapping
In the initial prototype implementation, FUs are implemented for each pro-
cessing step of the robust heart rate detection algorithm (Figure 3.1). So
the application mapping on the hardware system is supposed to be straight-
forward, done simply by calling the intrinsic functions following the order
of the heart rate detection flow and passing the corresponding parameters
to the FU configuration registers. But since we do not have the modified
MIPS compiler yet to generate the assembly code from the C program, we
manually wrote the assembly code to configure and execute the FUs for heart
rate detection. We modified the assembler that comes with the open source
MIPS processor to support the extended instructions and used it to assem-
ble the manually written assembly code. After the assembling process, the
assembled machine code is put into the instruction memory of the hardware
system. Then the heart rate detection application starts to run after resetting
the program counter (PC) to point to the first machine code instruction.
In the application, the FUs are first configured for ABP processing to
extract all the ABP features used for heart rate fusion: ABP Kalman filtered
heart rate (HRABP ), ABP Kalman residue (rABP ), and ABP window signal
quality (SQABP ). Then the FUs are configured with ECG parameters for
ECG processing to extract the corresponding ECG features: (HRECG, rECG,
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Figure 4.4: Memory layout of robust heart rate application in the hardware
and SQECG). In the end, the ABP and ECG features are passed to the FU10
(heart rate fusion) to compute the weighted heart rate. The computation
processes are introduced in Chapter 3.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the memory layout of the application in the RRHMS
hardware system. The numbers in the figure are the memory addresses.
The memory system of the RRHMS is word-addressable, so each memory
location is 4 bytes. The variables in the format of X addr are pointers to the
memory address of X. So the inputs (raw ABP and ECG signals) are loaded
into the memory locations of 30-1279 and 1280-2529, respectively, which are
pointed to by the pointer variables in the memory locations of 1 and 2,
respectively. The output (weighted heart rate) is stored in memory location
16. Some memory entries are shared for both ABP and ECG computations.
For example, the variable in memory location 3 is a pointer to the low-
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pass filtered values of both ABP and ECG signals. Therefore, both low-
pass filtered values (with 1250 data points) of ABP and ECG signals are in
the memory location of 1280-2529. Similarly, the other memory variables in
parentheses in the figure are interpreted in the same way. The shared memory
entries are usually used to store intermediate results in the ABP and ECG
computations. Since the two signals are not processed in parallel, memories
of the intermediate results are shared to reduce the memory footprint. As
a result, the total amount of memory needed in the RRHMS is 6497*4 =
25,988 bytes. So the 32 KB Block RAM in FPGA implementation or 32 KB
SRAM in ASIC implementation is enough for the RRHMS memory system.
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Chapter 5
RRHMS FAULT TOLERANCE DESIGN
This chapter introduces the low-overhead hardware fault detection and re-
covery mechanism used in RRHMS. We describe the hardware fault models
and fault injections and then the hardware coverage of the proposed fault
tolerance mechanism. Following that, the fault detection and recovery tech-
niques are explained. At the end, the proposed fault tolerance technique is
described, and various tradeoffs are discussed.
5.1 Fault Model and Injection
The fault model applied in this thesis is the independent low-level transistor
fault. This fault may flip the result of its logic gate and then propagate to
affect the application’s output. We focus on transient fault detection and
recovery. As for permanent faults, the proposed fault tolerance mechanism
can detect them but cannot recover from them. To simulate faulty behavior
in the hardware, we use fault injection at different levels, as follows:
(1) Application: inject faults into the application code, such as flip a bit
in the application variable or change the application control flows.
(2) Assembly/machine code: change the bit in the instruction code, which
may affect the instruction opcode, register value, branch direction, etc.
(3) Behavior hardware: inject faults into the behavior hardware description
code in Verilog/VHDL, such as flip the bit in the pipeline data path,
in the program counter, in the decoder, etc.
(4) Hardware gate: inject faults into the gate-level hardware code that is
obtained from the hardware synthesis, such as flip the output of a logic
gate.
(5) Transistor : inject faults into the hardware transistors after the hard-
ware synthesis and place-and-route, such as change the output current
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or resistance of a transistor.
The application and assembly/machine code level fault injections are easy to
implement and allow fast simulation, but they are only able to simulate faults
that have a direct impact on the application. There are many low-level faults
they cannot simulate, such as the fault that occurs in the hardware control
logics and causes the hardware to hang in an infinite state loop. Behavior
hardware level fault injection can simulate most low-level faults, but it is
difficult to implement this fault injector to cover all the signal bits. This is
because different signals written in the behavior hardware code have different
formats, naming conventions, and bit widths. Therefore, the fault injection
process (adding MUXs to the signal for fault simulation) cannot be auto-
mated. Transistor level fault injection best simulates the fault behavior that
occurs in real life in the transistors. It can also realistically simulate how
low-level transistor faults may propagate to affect the application results.
However, the large amount of simulation time needed for analog level simu-
lations (e.g., it may take days or even months to simulate just one second of
hardware execution) makes it unfeasible for our experiment. As a result, we
selected hardware gate level fault injection and inject random faults into the
synthesized logic gates of the RRHMS. This choice is based on the following
reasons:
(1) It simulates low-level faults with high fidelity. Normally, a faulty tran-
sistor causes its logic gate (and, or, xor, etc.) to output the incorrect
result.
(2) The process is easy to automate, since the output of the synthesized
logic gate is a single bit.
(3) Even though the simulation time is long, it can complete in a reasonable
amount of time for our purposes, i.e., in a matter of hours.
Since we focus on transient fault detection and recovery, we inject tran-
sient faults into the RRHMS hardware by randomly flipping the output of
the synthesized logic gates. The logic gates are flipped independently at the
adjustable fault injection rate. More details of the fault injection implemen-
tation can be found in Section 6.4.2.
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5.2 Hardware Coverage
The low-overhead fault detection and recovery mechanism proposed in this
thesis protects all the FUs in the RRHMS hardware system, as highlighted
in the yellow box of Figure 5.1. Table 5.1 lists the percentages of the area,
power consumption, and runtime of all the FUs in the hardware processing
part for both FPGA and ASIC implementations. The hardware processing
part (FU ASIC accelerator + MIPS controller) is the RRHMS hardware
system without the shared on-chip memory. From the table, we see that the
FUs account for more than 94% of the hardware area, more than 92% of the
power consumption, and more than 97% of the application execution time.
Therefore, the proposed low-overhead fault tolerance mechanism is able to
protect most (or almost all) of the processing hardware for the robust heart
rate detection application. The fault tolerance for the remaining part of the
hardware system (MIPS controller, system coordination and configuration
bus, memory arbiter, and shared on-chip memory) is not the focus of this
thesis. Since the remaining processing hardware only accounts for small area
Figure 5.1: Hardware coverage of the proposed fault tolerance mechanism
Table 5.1: Percentages of all FUs in FPGA and ASIC implementations
FPGA ASIC
Area (%) 94.46 93.28
Power (%) 92.82 92.83
Runtime(%) 97.22
Note: the percentages are for the processing hardware part
(RRHMS hardware except memory: FU ASIC accelerator and
MIPS controller).
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and power percentages, simply applying double or triple modular redundancy
(DMR or TMR) to enhance their reliability does not introduce much area
and power overhead (less than 10% in DMR and less than 20% in TMR).
In addition, the on-chip memory can be protected by applying the popular
error-correction coding (ECC) technique [102].
5.3 Fault Detection
FU hardware faults are detected using heartbeats and invariant checking
[26] techniques in the hardware. The heartbeat is recorded by the heartbeat
counter to detect FU hangs during the execution. In the RRHMS, normal FU
executions never result in FU hangs. Therefore, an FU hang is an indicator
of a hardware fault. One possible cause of FU hangs is the hardware fault
that occurs in the control logics of the FU state machine controller and
results in an infinite state loop. When the FU execution starts, the heartbeat
counter is reset and starts to count the number of cycles of the FU execution.
There is a timeout register for each FU that can be configured to set the
limit of the cycle number allowed for the FU’s execution. In each cycle
during the execution, the value of the heartbeat counter is checked with the
corresponding FU timeout register. If the value of the heartbeat counter is
larger than the value set in the timeout register, an FU hang, and hence an
FU fault, is detected.
In addition to heartbeat, the invariants are checked to detected faults that
may not result in FU hangs but do cause the FU to behave incorrectly in
writing results. According to [26], program invariants are the conditions
that hold true during the program’s execution. Therefore, if any invariant is
violated, it means a fault has occurred. Two kinds of invariants are used in
the proposed fault detection mechanism: address invariants, which are in the
FU result writing address, and result invariants, which are in the FU result.
Address invariants are obtained during the compiling of the applica-
tion, when the compiler assigns the memory locations at which each FU
will write its final computation results. Since in our prototype we write the
assembly code for the application, the memory locations of FU results are
manually set, and the address invariants are obtained directly during the as-
sembly implementation of the application. Some FUs only generate a single
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Table 5.2: FU result invariants, profiled with 1000 windows (2.78 hours) of
patient data (a40050) from the MIMIC II database
Result Invariant
Functional Unit min max mindiff maxdiff
FU0 - low-pass
for ABP 32.40 176.10 –18.60 23.40
for ECG –6.32 7.25 –4.16 –4.16
FU1 - slope sum
for ABP 0.00 87.30 –20.70 52.20
for ECG 0.00 18.18 –16.62 18.18
FU2 - peak detection
peak index 0.00 1240.00 45.00 322.00
peak number 1.00 17.00 –8.00 13.00
FU3 - heart rate 53.35 104.53 –37.19 40.40
FU4 - Kalman filter
filtered value 26.35 100.55 –25.09 17.99
residue –92.87 66.60 - -
FU5 - signal quality 0.00 1.00 - -
FU6 - derivative –4.16 4.02 –6.38 8.18
FU7 - squaring 0.00 17.31 –11.14 16.62
FU8 - ABP beat quality 0.00 1.00 - -
FU9 - ECG beat quality 2.16 8.98 - -
FU10 - heart rate fusion 86.73 100.51 –1.50 2.58
Note: the following conditions hold true during the corresponding FU execution:
yi ≥ min, yi ≤ max, yi− yi−1 ≥ mindiff , and yi− yi−1 ≤ maxdiff , where yi
is the current result value and yi−1 is the previous result value.
result, such as FU3 (heart rate), FU5 (signal window quality), FU10 (heart
rate fusion), and others. So the result address for each of them is an exact
memory location, and this is used as the corresponding FU’s address invari-
ant. The other FUs generate result arrays instead of single results, such as
FU0 (low-pass filter), FU1 (slope sum), FU2 (peak detection), and others.
The result address for each of them is a memory range. Additionally, since
they write the result elements one by one from the lower index, the memory
addresses of two consecutive writes differ only by one. Therefore, for these
FUs, both the result memory ranges and address differences between con-
secutive writes serve as their address invariants. Therefore, if an FU tries to
write its result to a memory location other than the one it is assigned, the
cause must be a hardware fault in the FU. Such behavior is considered an
address invariant violation and a hardware fault indicator. Once the appli-
cation is compiled, the FU address invariants do not change with changing
patient data. However, this is not the case for the result invariants.
Result invariants are obtained by application profiling using patient
data. Since each FU is responsible for a processing step in the heart rate
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detection flow (Figure 3.1), the output of each FU has a specific high-level
application meaning. This contrasts with the output of basic instructions,
like addition, and subtraction, in a general-purpose processor. Therefore,
meaningful patterns can be found in the FU results of the proposed hard-
ware system. For example, the results of the low-pass filter FU are the
biomedical signals with high-frequency noise removed. So they must be
within a meaningful range, based on physiological limitations, such as the
highest and lowest possible blood pressures. In addition, since the biomed-
ical signals are sampled at a specific frequency (125 Hz for our data), the
difference between two consecutive low-pass filtered data should be within
another range, according to the slope of the signal waveform. We use this
property to obtain the FU result invariants to detect FU faults. The FU re-
sult invariants are profiled with the target patient’s data for patient-specific
fault detection. Table 5.2 lists the example result invariants of the 11 FUs
in the RRHMS, obtained by profiling 1000 windows (2.78 hours) of patient
data (a40050) from the MIMIC II database. Similar to address invariants,
both the result range and difference between consecutive computed results
are profiled and used as result invariants. The first two columns of the re-
sult invariants in Table 5.2 are the minimum and maximum values of the
corresponding FU results (lower and upper bound of the result range), and
the other two columns of result invariants are the minimum and maximum
values of the difference between consecutive computed results. Both of the
two kinds of result invariants are not profiled for every FU, as some of them
are meaningless for fault detection. For example, the Kalman residue value
computed in FU4 and signal quality value computed by FU5 represent the
quality of the signal in the current window. So the difference between the
consecutive results of those FUs indicates the difference of the signal qualities
between consecutive windows, which depends on the bio-sensors. Using them
as result invariants may mistakenly detect sensor changes as FU faults. This
also explains the missing result invariants of FU8 and FU9, which evaluate
signal beat qualities. The result invariants are signal- and patient-specific,
similar to some FU parameters (like threshold parameters for peak detec-
tion). Therefore, they are designed to allow configurations using the same
bus interface as the FU configuration registers.
With the heartbeats and invariant checking, the proposed fault detection
mechanism is able to detect the hardware faults (both transient and perma-
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nent) that cause the FU to:
(1) hang (enter infinite state loop and unable to finish execution within
the amount of time specified by its timeout register),
(2) write result to a memory location that violates its address invariants,
or
(3) produce incorrect results that violate its result invariants.
The FUs in the existing hardware system do not need to be modified for the
proposed fault detection mechanism or for the proposed recovery mechanism
introduced in the next section. The proposed fault detection and recovery
are handled by a specialized hardware module, the fault detection and re-
covery unit (FDRU), depicted in Figure 5.2, The FDRU sits in the FU ASIC
accelerator. It both monitors the system coordination and configuration bus
for FU commands (configuration and execution) and listens to the memory
arbiter for FU memory requests.
Figure 5.3 illustrates the operation flow of FDRU. When no FU is exe-
cuting, FDRU is in State 1, waiting for FU instructions sent from the MIPS
controller. When the FU configuration instruction (FU CFG) is sent, FDRU
stores these values for the FU configuration register at the time of the con-
figuration of the corresponding FU (State 2 ). This way, FDRU keeps a syn-
chronized copy of the configuration register values of all FUs; these values are
used for the recovery process. Upon receiving the FU execution instruction
(FU START) from the MIPS controller, FDRU enters State 3 and starts
Figure 5.2: Fault detection and recovery unit (FDRU) in hardware system
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the heartbeat counter. During the FU execution, FDRU stays in State 3,
where it checks the heartbeat counter for FU hang detection and monitors
the FU memory write request address and result invariants. When there is
either an invariant violation during the FU memory write or a time out in
the heartbeat counter, FDRU starts the fault recovery process. If neither is
detected and the FU finishes normally (sends a DONE signal to the system
coordination and configuration bus), FDRU goes back to State 1 to wait for
new FU instructions.
5.4 Fault Recovery
To recover from a detected FU fault, the corresponding FU is re-executed
after being reset and reconfigured. If the fault is transient, re-execution is
enough to recover from it, since the same fault is unlikely to occur in the
re-execution. However, if the detected fault is permanent, re-execution will
result in detection of the same fault. After three re-executions, if the fault
Figure 5.3: Fault detection and recovery unit (FDRU) operation flow
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still exists, the application is aborted and the user is notified. The proposed
fault recovery mechanism is able to recover from the detected transient fault,
but not from the permanent one.
Similar to the fault detection mechanism, the proposed fault recovery
mechanism does not need FU modifications; it is also handled by FDRU. On
detecting an FU fault, FDRU starts the fault recovery process. For either
invariant violation or heartbeat timeout, three chances are allowed. This
means that if, in a single FU execution, an invariant violation is detected
three times or an FU hang is detected three times, the fault is considered to
be unrecoverable, and the application is aborted and the user notified. This
phenomenon may be caused either by a permanent fault or by a transient
fault that continually occurs in re-executions, signifying that the transient
fault rate is high. As shown in Figure 5.3, FDRU maintains two variables,
violate# and hang#, to track the number of times each kind of fault has oc-
curred. Both variables are reset to 0 when the FU is about to start execution
and before FDRU enters State 3. If the detected fault has not occurred three
times in the current execution, the corresponding variable is incremented for
this detection and FDRU goes to State 4. Here it resets the FU to stop the
current execution by sending it the reset signal and reconfigures all config-
uration registers of the FU with the copy it has stored in State 2. The FU
reconfiguration is achieved by the FU configuration instructions (FU CFG)
sent from FDRU. This is necessary because the fault may corrupt some con-
figuration register values, either directly in the configuration register bits or
indirectly by propagating to change the configuration register values. After
reset and reconfiguration, FDRU enters State 5 to restart the FU execution
by sending it the FU execution instruction (FU START), after which it goes
back to State 3 and monitors the re-execution in the same way.
Therefore, FDRU is designed for the existing hardware architecture by
using the same system bus used by the MIPS controller for FU operations
to implement fault recovery. It also uses the memory arbiter design that
collects the FU memory requests to do invariant checking. As a result, no
major modification is needed in the baseline hardware system to incorporate
FDRU to enable fault tolerance in FUs. In addition, the overhead of FDRU
is low. For hardware area (resource) overhead, besides the simple state logics
(Figure 5.3), FDRU only needs to maintain (1) a copy of the values of all
FU configuration registers (Table 4.1), (2) timeout registers for each FU and
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a heartbeat counter, (3) address and result invariants of each FU (Table
5.2) and invariant checkers (hardware comparators). As for performance,
FDRU does not introduce any overhead. Its operations, shown in Figure
5.3, are completely in parallel with the baseline hardware executions. Any
power overhead results from the parallel updates of configuration registers
and fault detections (invariant and heartbeat checking). This overhead is
much smaller than the power consumption of the baseline hardware. In
addition, the FDRU module does not decrease the reliability of the baseline
RRHMS hardware system. If FDRU fails, the baseline system continues to
operate normally, just as if there were no fault tolerance protection.
5.5 Fault Tolerance Coverage Discussion
The proposed fault detection and recovery mechanism with FDRU has much
smaller area and power overheads than the traditional fault tolerance tech-
nique using double modular redundancy (DMR), which is only able to recover
from transient fault through re-execution. The area and power overheads in
DMR are each over 100% because the hardware modules and operations need
to be duplicated. The detailed FDRU overhead results are discussed in Sec-
tion 6.4.1. The tradeoff for this small overhead is in fault detection coverage.
DMR is able to detect any fault that causes a result mismatch between du-
plicate executions. FDRU is only able to detect faults that result in an FU
hang, address invariant violation, or result invariant violation. But a fault
may lead to an incorrect FU result without causing an FU hang or violating
any invariant conditions. For example, if the result invariants listed in Ta-
ble 5.2 are used, a fault that occurs in FU0 during ABP computation may
generate a result that (1) is written to the correct memory location, (2) is
within the range of [32.40, 176.10], and (3) has a difference within the range
of [–18.60, 23.40] between its consecutive results (the results before and after
it). Nonetheless, this incorrect low-pass filtered result may cause incorrect
peaks to be detected and result in an incorrect final heart rate estimation.
The proposed fault detection mechanism in FDRU cannot detect this kind
of fault. Fortunately, this kind of fault is rare, even under a high fault rate,
as shown in Section 6.4.3.
In addition, fault detection by FDRU depends on profiling of the result
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(a) Range of the low-pass filtered ABP values
(b) Range of the low-pass filtered ECG values
(c) Range of the detected peak number in a window
Figure 5.4: Relationship between result invariants and profiled window
number with patient (a40050) data from the MIMIC II database (the range
becomes larger with more profiled data)
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invariants. It should be noted that there is a tradeoff between fault detection
coverage and the false positive rate. A false positive may be caused by an
non-profiled scenario that causes a result invariant violation. For example,
abnormal signal inputs may cause out-of-range low-pass filtered results, not
just by hardware faults. If this particular abnormal scenario did not occur
during invariant profiling, the invariant range may not include the corre-
sponding results. The basic problem is that if result invariants are set too
tightly (include only the few profiled data), FU faults caused by new da-
ta scenarios may generate false alarms; on the other hand, if they are set
too loosely (include the full range of all possible integer values), invariant
checking becomes useless.
This tradeoff is illustrated in Figure 5.4, which shows three examples of
the relationship between the profiled invariant range and number of profiled
windows. The blue area in the figure is the range of the invariant profiled
with the number of windows specified by the x-axis value. The lower edge of
the blue area is the lower bound of the invariant range, and the upper edge is
the upper bound. As the number of profiled windows increases, the profiled
invariant range becomes larger (the lower bound becomes smaller, and the
upper bound becomes larger) because more data scenarios are included. For
example, in Figure 5.4a, if only the first 500 windows of patient data are
profiled, the invariant range obtained for the low-pass filtered ABP value
(result of FU0) is [34.20, 128.70] (range1). If the first 1000 windows of patient
data are profiled, the range is [32.40, 176.10] (range2). When 4000 windows
(11.11 hours of patient data) are profiled, which include 11 occurrences of
arrythmia problems, the range becomes [30.00, 176.10] (range3). Therefore,
if range1 is used as the result invariant of FU0 for ABP processing, the
result of 176.10 caused by the new input scenario will be mistakenly detected
as an FU fault. On the other hand, if range3 is used as the invariant,
the detection coverage becomes smaller. In this case, the result of 176.10
when processing the first 500 windows must be caused by the FU fault, but
since it does not violate any invariant range, it will go detected. Section
6.4.4 analyzes detection coverage with different invariant ranges obtained by
profiling different numbers of windows. Since the probability of the above
undetected case is low, profiling should include as much data as possible to
prevent false positives.
However, sometimes it is impossible to include all scenarios in profiling be-
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cause the signal changes and patient problems are rare in real life. Therefore,
to reduce false positives, the doctor’s knowledge of the patient can be com-
bined with profiling to set the result invariants in some FUs whose invariants
depend on the input signals, such as low-pass filter (FU0), slope sum (FU1),
heart rate (FU3), and others. For those FUs, the patient’s physiological lim-
itations can be used to find the invariants (e.g., the patient’s heart rate never
exceeds 250 bpm nor drops below 30 bpm). The other FUs do not have this
problem, such as signal quality (FU5), ABP and ECG beat qualities (FU8
and FU9), and others. For example, the result of FU5 (percentage of good
beats in the window) should always be between 0 and 1, no matter what the
inputs are.
A false positive, on the other hand, is not always harmful. Sometimes it
is an indication of severe signal corruptions that may be caused by sensor
disconnection. If the invariants are set by profiling long periods of data with
the patient’s physiological limitations considered, and if a detected fault is
not actually caused by a hardware fault, then it is certain that the detected
fault is caused by input that is beyond the patient’s physiological limitation,
which is very likely due to severe signal corruption and is worth the user’s
attention.
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Chapter 6
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This chapter starts with a discussion of the accuracy of the heart rate de-
tection algorithm introduced in Chapter 3, followed by an evaluation the
proposed RRHMS hardware system implemented on both ASIC and FPGA
platforms. The same application is also implemented on a Nexus 7 tablet
for comparison with the embedded processors on the market. At the begin-
ning of the hardware evaluation, experiment setups are introduced for the
implementations on the three platforms (Android, FPGA, and ASIC). Then
the baseline RRHMS without fault tolerance features is evaluated, and the
three platform implementations are compared. Then follows an evaluation
of the proposed fault tolerance technique using FDRU, where the overheads
and fault tolerance coverage under injected hardware faults are discussed.
6.1 Heart Rate Detection Accuracy
The heart rate detection algorithm introduced in Chapter 3 is implemented
in MATLAB to evaluate its accuracy. The hardware implementations are
compared with the results of the MATLAB code to check the implementation
correctness. We first compared the algorithmically optimized ABP and ECG
beat detection algorithm with the original algorithms [18] and [28] for ECG
and ABP beat detections, respectively. We used the patient data from the
MIMIC II database with 24 patients, totaling 270.9 hours of ECG and ABP
data. Both ECG and ABP beats detected by our optimized algorithm match
the results of the original algorithms. In addition, we manually inspected
several segments of the raw data with the detected beats marked, and all the
inspected detected beats match our manual annotations.
The heart rate fusion algorithm that we applied, by weighting on the signal
qualities and Kalman residues, was proposed and validated in [21]. Our ex-
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(a) Kalman filtered ABP heart rates
(b) Kalman filtered ECG rates
(c) Weighted heart rate
Figure 6.1: Kalman filtered ABP and ECG heart rates for 1000 windows,
and final weighted heart rates of the corresponding windows (data from the
MIMIC II database patient a40050)
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Figure 6.2: ABP and ECG signal qualities (the corresponding signal
qualities that are used to obtain the heart rate fusion results in Figure 6.1)
periments also prove its effectiveness. The heart rate fusion examples shown
in Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 illustrate that the fusion algorithm is able to
provide continuous robust heart rate monitoring even when one signal is
corrupted by noise and artifacts. In addition, Figure 6.1 provides another
example with 1000 windows of patient (a40050) data, where the ABP signal
is corrupted around window 360 and window 570, and the fusion algorithm
fixes the ABP corruption by weighting more on the better quality ECG sig-
nals during the two window segments. Figure 6.2 explains the reason behind
the effectiveness of the fusion algorithm in Figure 6.1 by showing and com-
paring the signal qualities of ABP and ECG for the corresponding windows.
The figure shows that at around window 360 and window 570, ABP quality
becomes low while ECG quality is high. Therefore, more weight is put on
the heart rate extracted from the ECG signal.
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6.2 Hardware Experiment Setup
The proposed RRHMS is implemented both in ASIC design using the Synop-
sys Design Compiler and on the Xilinx FGPA platform. ASIC is the target
platform for the final product of the RRHMS to provide heart rate monitor-
ing with low energy. FPGA is the platform that uses the proposed hardware
system as a framework for efficient embedded system designs (by adding and
removing FUs for the target embedded application). Therefore, both ASIC
and FPGA implementations are evaluated in this thesis. For comparison
with the embedded processors on the market, the same heart rate detection
application is implemented as an Android application on the Asus Nexus 7
tablet (2013 model).
Table 6.1 lists the experiment setups of the three platforms: Android,
FPGA, and ASIC. For the Android implementation, the Android software
development kit downloaded from the Android developer’s website [103] is
used to compile and load the application to the target hardware, a Nexus 7
tablet. The Nexus 7 tablet is equipped with the Qualcomm Snapdragon S4
chipset running at 1.5 GHz. The Android application on the tablet runs in
the Krait processor on the chipset, which is architecturally similar to the AR-
M processor. The execution time of the application is recorded by inserting
time measure functions in the code before and after the heart rate detection
Table 6.1: Experiment setup on the three platforms
Platform Frequency Design Tools Evaluation Tools
Android Snapdragon
S4 @ 1.5
GHz
Android SDK [103] (test
and evaluate on the 2013
Asus Nexus 7 tablet)
Qualcomm Trepn Pro-
filer [104] and
FPGA 66.6 MHz Xilinx ISE Design Suite
14.2 (test and evaluate
on the Virtex 5 ML507
(XC5VFX70T) FPGA
board)
Modelsim SE 10.1a,
Xilinx ISE, and Xilinx
Power Analyzer
ASIC 100 MHz
(up to
222.2 MHz)
Processing logics: Syn-
opsys Design Compiler [27]
with NanGate 45 nm Open
Cell Library [105]. On-
chip memory: Synopsys
Generic Memory Compiler
(32 nm) [106]
Modelsim SE 10.1a and
Synopsys Design Com-
piler with NanGate 45
nm and Generic Mem-
ory Compiler 32 nm
SRAM libraries [105,
106]
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portion. The power consumption on the Android platform is profiled using
the Qualcomm Trepn Profiler [104]. To obtain accurate power consumption
of only the heart rate detection, the baseline power of the application without
starting heart rate detection is measured first. Then the total power is mea-
sured with the heart rate detection executing. The power difference between
the two measurements is the power consumption of the heart rate detection
on Android. During both execution time and power measurements, all the
other Android applications and services are turned off.
The Xilinx Virtex 5 ML507 board (XC5VFX70T) is used for FPGA imple-
mentation. The RRHMS run on the actual FPGA board, while the reported
results are collected from the simulation of the FPGA-synthesized design of
the hardware. The Xilinx ISE Design Suite is an integrated Xilinx software
platform for Xilinx FPGA synthesizing, mapping, and routing. We use the
14.2 version of Xilinx ISE to implement the RRHMS hardware that is written
in VHDL and Verilog. The processing logic of the hardware system (non-
memory part: FU ASIC accelerator and MIPS controller) is implemented in
the FPGA logics, and the on-chip memory is implemented as Block RAM
on the FPGA board. The application’s execution time on FPGA is calcu-
lated by the multiplication of the hardware cycle number and clock period.
The hardware cycle number is obtained from cycle-accurate simulation in
Modelsim SE 10.1a, and the clock period is obtained from the timing report
generated by Xilinx ISE after FPGA routing. In the FPGA implementation,
the maximum clock frequency achieved is 66.6 MHz (15 ns clock period).
The power consumption of FPGA is profiled using the Xilinx Power Ana-
lyzer. To obtain accurate power results, signal activities are collected from
the post-routing simulation in the Modelsim simulator. With the signal ac-
tivities provided, the Power Analyzer shows high confidence in the profiled
power number, which we use as the FPGA power consumption.
In ASIC implementation, separate tools are applied to synthesize the on-
chip memory and processing logic (FU ASIC accelerator and MIPS con-
troller) of the RRHMS. The Synopsys Design Compiler [27] is used to syn-
thesize the processing logic with the 45 nm NanGate Open Cell Library [105].
The Synopsys Generic Memory Compiler [106] is used to synthesize the on-
chip memory using 32 nm SRAM technology. (There is no 45 nm SRAM in
the Generic Memory Compiler, and 32 nm is the closest available technology
process to the 45 nm used for the processing logic.) The ASIC implementa-
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tion of the RRHMS is only simulated (not tested on the real taped-out chip).
Similar to FPGA implementation, the execution time of ASIC is obtained by
the multiplication of the hardware cycle number from Modelsim simulation
and the clock period from the ASIC synthesis process. To compare the three
platforms, the 100 MHz clock frequency of ASIC is chosen; its maximum
synthesized clock frequency is 222.2 MHz. The power of ASIC is profiled
from the tools in the Design Compiler, which takes three kinds of input files
for accurate power estimation: (1) synthesized netlist files, (2) technology
library files (NanGate 45 nm cell library and Generic Memory Compiler 32
nm SRAM library), and (3) signal activities (processing logic and memory
activities) collected from the post-synthesis simulation in Modelsim.
6.3 Baseline RRHMS Evaluation
This section evaluates the baseline RRHMS without fault tolerance features.
The runtime performance, power, and energy consumptions of the Android,
FPGA, and ASIC implementations are compared. Then, the total resource
utilizations of the FPGA and ASIC implementations are introduced. Finally,
the breakdowns of runtime, resource utilization, and power consumption of
the processor logics (FU ASIC accelerator and MIPS controller) on the FPGA
and ASIC platforms are discussed.
6.3.1 Comparison of Android, FPGA, and ASIC
The application results of Android, FPGA, and ASIC implementations are
compared with MATLAB simulations to ensure the implementation correct-
ness. For comparison, 1000 windows of patient data (both ABP and ECG
data collected at 125 Hz frequency) are processed for robust heart rate es-
timation. Table 6.2 lists the results of runtime performance, power, and
energy consumption of the ASIC implementation to process the 1000 win-
dows of data. Figure 6.3 compares the different results on the three platforms
(all platform results are normalized to the results of ASIC).
As shown in Table 6.2, ASIC finishes processing 1000 windows of data in
only 0.211 s. So on average, ASIC only takes about 0.211 ms to process a
single window containing 10 s of patient data. Therefore, for each 10 s of
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Table 6.2: Runtime, power, and energy results of ASIC implementation (run
of 1000 windows of patient data (a40050) from the MIMIC II database)
Runtime (s) Power (mW) Energy (mJ)
Processing logic* - 6.887 1.453
On-chip memory - 0.4541 0.0958
Total 0.211 7.341 1.549
*Processing logic: FU ASIC accelerator and MIPS controller (non-memory part).
patient data collected from the sensors, the ASIC implementation can es-
timate an average heart rate in 0.211 ms (active in 0.00211% of the time).
As a result, ASIC works in the duty cycle manner to save energy consump-
tion. It only needs to be woken up every 10 s when a new window of data
is ready. After processing, it can be put in sleep mode with the power gat-
ing technique. The power consumptions of the processing logic and on-chip
memory are profiled separately. The power number reported in the table is
the active power consumption, including both dynamic and static (leakage)
powers, during the processing of the 1000 windows of data. Most of the pow-
er (93.82%) is consumed in the processing logic because the computation is
not memory-intensive and the memory is synthesized with a more advanced
technology library (32 nm). In total, the ASIC active power consumption
during the processing is only 7.341 mW. “Energy consumption” in the table
means the total energy consumed to process the 1000 windows of data. It is
calculated by multiplying the active power consumption with the runtime.
The total energy consumed to process 1000 windows (10,000 s) of patient
data is only 1.549 mJ. Therefore, if the ASIC implementation is duty cycled
with power gating, the approximate average power consumption during daily
monitoring is calculated as 1.549 mJ / 10,000 s = 0.1549 µW (patient data
is sampled at 125 Hz).
Compared with ASIC, the execution times needed to process the same
amount of data (1000 windows) on Android and FPGA platforms are 20.62
and 1.50 times longer, respectively, as illustrated by Figure 6.3a. The speedup
of ASIC compared to Android implementation is mainly due to: (1) the
efficiency of the RRHMS FU modules that are optimized with ASIC logics,
and (2) the faster memory access with the on-chip memory design. On the
other hand, since the same underlying register transfer level (RTL) hardware
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(a) Runtime performance comparison
(b) Power consumption comparison
(c) Energy consumption comparison
Figure 6.3: Comparison of the Android, FPGA, and ASIC implementations
(run of 1000 windows of patient data from the MIMIC II database)
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design is used in both the FPGA and ASIC implementations, the hardware
cycles to run the same application with the same input data on these two
platforms are also the same. The speedup of ASIC compared to FPGA is
due only to the higher clock frequency.
ASIC also achieves the lowest power consumption in the comparison (Fig-
ure 6.3b). The power consumption compared in the figure is also the active
power during the processing of the data. The power consumption of Android
is 139.25 times that of ASIC, while the power consumption of FPGA is 2.08
times that of ASIC. This is because ASIC has the least hardware complexi-
ty. The Android implementation runs on the Krait processor of the Nexus 7
tablet, a general purpose embedded processor that has complicated process-
ing pipelines and hierarchical memory systems. It is designed to reduce the
processing latency of general applications. On the other hand, the ASIC im-
plementation of the RRHMS hardware system is composed of FUs designed
especially for computation of the target application, and it is directly synthe-
sized with logic gates. Furthermore, due to the small memory size required,
the on-chip memory implemented with SRAM is directly used as the main
memory of ASIC. This greatly simplifies the memory system and reduces
the corresponding power consumption. The FPGA implementation benefits
from the same FU designs to efficiently support computations and from the
small memory footprint to reduce the complexity of memory system. As a
result, FPGA also achieves good power efficiency (about 1/67 of Android’s
power). However, FPGA logics are realized with look-up tables instead of
logic gates, which adds some complexity and overhead. Therefore, the FPGA
implementation consumes more power than the ASIC implementation does.
The energy comparison in Figure 6.3c compares the total energy consumed
to process the 1000 windows of data on the three platforms. Energy consump-
tion, calculated by multiplying execution time and active power consumption,
directly affects the battery life. Since compared with Android, both FPGA
and ASIC implementations can finish the processing in less time and at
smaller power consumptions, they both achieve much better energy efficien-
cy than Android (about 1/923 and 1/2871 of Android’s energy consumption,
respectively). Therefore, given the same battery capacity, the FPGA and
ASIC platforms of the RRHMS are able to achieve as much as 923 and 2871
times more battery life of the Android platform, assuming the inactive power
is negligible, which can be achieved with power gating in the sleep mode.
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In summary, the comparison results show that the proposed RRHMS in
both FPGA and ASIC implementations is much more energy-efficient than
the general-purpose embedded processor, such as Krait, to provide real-time
heart rate monitoring. This enables RRHMS to achieve longer battery life,
as well as portability, by not requiring a big, heavy battery to support it.
6.3.2 RRHMS Resource Utilization
Table 6.3 lists the resource utilizations of RRHMS in the FPGA and ASIC
implementations. In the FPGA implementation, resource utilization data
are obtained from the module-level utilization report generated from the
FPGA mapping process in Xilinx ISE. The total processing logic occupies
11,856 look-up tables (LUTs) and 22 DSP48E slices of the FPGA resource.
The RRHMS on-chip memory is implemented using the 32 KB Block RAM
on the FPGA board. In the ASIC implementation, the processing logic is
synthesized with 53,697 cell gates and occupies 0.121 mm2 of the die area.
The on-chip memory in ASIC is synthesized as 32 KB SRAM with the 32
nm library of the Generic Memory Compiler (different from the 45 nm cell
library for processing logic), which accounts for 0.195 mm2 of the die area.
Table 6.3: Resource utilizations of the RRHMS on FPGA and ASIC
FPGA ASIC
Processing logic* 11,856 LUTs** + 22 DSP48E 53,697 cell gates (0.121 mm2)
On-chip memory 32 KB Block RAM 32 KB SRAM (0.195 mm2)
*Processing logic: FU ASIC accelerator and MIPS controller (non-memory part).
**LUT means look-up table (LUT is 6-input for the Virtex 5 FPGA family).
6.3.3 Runtime, Resource, and Power Breakdown
Table 6.4 lists the breakdown of the runtime, resource utilization, and power
consumption of the processing logics (FU ASIC accelerator and MIPS con-
troller) in both FPGA and ASIC implementations. The breakdown of each
result is in terms of percentage. The absolute result of each part in the
table can be calculated with the total execution time, resource utilization,
and power consumption of the corresponding platform, which can be found
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Table 6.4: Runtime, resource utilization, and power breakdown
Runtime Resource (%) Power (%)
(%) FPGA ASIC FPGA ASIC
FUs
0: low-pass filter 11.88 4.08 3.76 10.65 4.68
1: slope sum 11.84 7.64 5.74 23.79 9.08
2: peak detection 24.32 14.65 7.14 8.67 5.78
3: heart rate 1.00 4.64 3.24 0.25 4.13
4: Kalman filter 0.29 6.34 9.77 0.05 7.93
5: signal quality 0.32 1.55 1.72 0.10 2.37
6: derivative 5.92 2.16 1.11 1.49 1.43
7: squaring 5.94 2.18 7.66 4.46 5.78
8: ABP beat quality 9.02 32.87 16.90 12.88 15.13
9: ECG beat quality 25.78 13.72 21.46 30.23 19.55
10: heart rate fusion 0.89 4.64 14.78 0.25 16.98
Memory arbiter - 1.75 0.97 1.73 0.59
MIPS 2.78 3.79 5.74 5.45 6.58
Note: the percentages are for the processing logic part (RRHMS hardware except
memory: FU ASIC accelerator and MIPS controller).
or derived from Table 6.2, Table 6.3, and Figure 6.3. The highest three
percentages of each breakdown result in the table columns (Table 6.4) are
highlighted.
The runtime breakdowns of the FPGA and ASIC implementations are the
same, as they are implemented with the same hardware design. In the cur-
rent prototype, the FUs are executed one by one (an FU starts execution
after the previous one finishes). So there is no overlap in the runtime of
the FUs. The runtime breakdown of the memory arbiter is not profiled be-
cause its operation is in parallel with the FU executions. From the runtime
breakdown, we can see that the FUs are responsible for most (97.22%) of the
computations. This is expected, as the FUs are designed to support the ma-
jor processing steps of the RRHMS heart rate detection application, and the
MIPS controller is mainly responsible for FU configurations and the schedul-
ing of FU executions. Among the FUs, FU0 (low-pass filter), FU2 (peak
detection), and FU9 (ECG beat quality) have the highest runtime percent-
ages. Both low-pass filter and ECG beat quality (kurtosis computation) are
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computation intensive, as they have to process a large amount of input data.
Peak detection is control intensive due to the threshold-based detection rules
(described by Algorithm 1 in Section 3.2).
The breakdowns of the resource utilization and power consumption are
different in the FPGA and ASIC implementations. The resource breakdown
of FPGA is based on the number of look-up tables (LUTs) used to implement
the corresponding module. The ASIC resource breakdown is calculated using
the area of each module. Most of the hardware resources are used for FU
implementations in both platforms (94.46% in FPGA and 93.28% in ASIC).
Therefore, although the proposed fault tolerance mechanism only protects the
FUs, most parts of the RRHMS hardware system are covered as discussed in
Section 5.2. Additionally, the total resource utilizations of the FU modules
shared between ABP and ECG processing (as highlighted in Figure 3.1) are
43.53% and 46.16% in FPGA and ASIC, respectively. This proves the effec-
tiveness of the algorithmic optimizations for sharing between ABP and ECG
processing, without which those resources might be double what they are.
The difference between the resource breakdown in the two implementations
is due to differences in the ways their hardware logics are synthesized and
implemented. In the ideal case, more hardware resources should be allocated
to the module that has the higher computation utilization (higher runtime
percentage). This is not the case in either FPGA or ASIC because some FUs
(processing steps) are not mathematically complicated but their input data
size and computation iteration number are large. FU0 (low-pass filter) and
FU1 (slope sum) are examples.
The power breakdowns for FPGA and ASIC implementations are direct-
ly obtained from the power report generated by the Xilinx Power Analyzer
and Synopsys Design Compiler, respectively. Similar to resource utilization,
most of the hardware power is consumed in the FUs (92.82% in FPGA and
92.83% in ASIC). This makes sense because most of the computations are
completed by the FUs. In general, the modules that have higher runtime
percentages consume more power. However, there are exceptions. For ex-
ample, the runtime percentage of FU2 (peak detection) is high (24.43%),
but it is not among the highest three power consuming modules. This is
because its execution contains several serialized threshold-based steps, and
in each step, only a small subset of its logics is active. On the other hand,
FU10 (heart rate fusion) has a very small runtime percentage (0.89%), but
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in ASIC implementation, it both has high resource utilization (14.78%) and
consumes a large amount of power (16.98%). No clear reason for this is found
by the initial inspection in the ASIC code; further investigation is needed to
explain it. The breakdown results provide guidance to further optimize the
RRHMS design, such as hardware resource allocation and software/hardware
partitioning (Section 7.2).
6.4 Fault Tolerance Evaluation
The proposed fault tolerance mechanism with the hardware fault detection
and recovery unit (FDRU) is evaluated in this section. First, the overheads
of FDRU in resource, power consumption, and performance are discussed,
followed by an introduction to the fault injection method used. The fault
tolerance coverage of FDRU is then analyzed by comparing the correctness of
heart rate detection under injected faults when FDRU is and is not applied.
Finally, the fault tolerance coverage is discussed, including the relationship
between the amount of data used for result invariant profiling and FDRU
coverage.
6.4.1 FDRU Overheads
As introduced in Chapter 5, the proposed fault tolerance mechanism is im-
plemented in FDRU. The overheads of FDRU in resource utilization, power
consumption, and performance are listed in Table 6.5. For resource overhead,
the FDRU implementation needs an extra 14.54% of the look-up tables used
by the baseline RRHMS hardware system on the FPGA platform. In ASIC,
FDRU needs an extra 15.54% of cell gates to implement, which accounts for
a 12.65% increase in die area. The resource overhead is due to:
(1) FDRU’s controlling state machine logics (illustrated by Figure 5.3),
(2) all FU configuration registers (listed in Table 4.1),
(3) timeout registers for each FU and a heartbeat counter (16-bit each),
and
(4) address and result invariants of each FU, as well as invariant checkers
for each invariant (hardware comparators).
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Table 6.5: FDRU overheads in FPGA and ASIC implementations
FPGA ASIC
Resource 14.54% look-up tables 15.54% cell gates (12.65% area)
Power* 37.01% 33.89%
Performance* 0%
*Power and performance overheads in the table are the overheads during normal
monitoring when no fault is detected. If there are faults, more overhead is introduced
by fault recovery (FU reconfiguration and re-execution).
During normal monitoring, when there is no fault, FDRU consumes 37.01%
and 33.89% more power in FPGA and ASIC implementations, respectively.
The extra power consumption is due mainly to the invariant and heartbeat
checking for FU fault detection. In addition, FDRU does not introduce
any performance overhead during normal monitoring because all the fault
detection checking is executed in parallel with FU executions. As a result,
FDRU does not incur extra cycles during the normal FU execution. Besides,
none of the fault detection checking is on the critical path of the RRHMS
hardware system, and therefore the clock frequency is not affected by FDRU
either. When faults are detected during the FU execution, extra power and
performance overheads are introduced by the fault recovery process, as FDRU
needs to reconfigure and re-execute the faulty FU to recover from the fault.
The specific numbers of the extra overheads depend on two factors:
(1) The frequency of FU fault detection. This is affected by the manifested
FU fault rate. When an FU fault is detected, the FU is reconfigured
and re-executed by FDRU, which consumes extra power.
(2) The specific FU involved. Different FUs have different numbers of
configuration registers and are responsible for different computations,
so the performance and power overheads incurred by them vary.
If the two factors are known (by simulation or in real-life testing), the specific
extra overheads can be calculated with the combined information of the FU
runtime and power breakdowns (Table 6.4).
Compared with the traditional fault tolerance technique of double modular
redundancy (DMR), where each FU must be duplicated, FDRU introduces
much smaller resource and power overheads. The resource and power over-
heads in DMR are over 100% for each, as DMR requires duplicate modules
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and operations for fault detection. The performance overheads during nor-
mal execution without fault are the same (0%) in DMR and FDRU. When
a fault occurs in DMR, only the transient fault is recoverable through re-
execution, as in the proposed FDRU. However, the tradeoff for the small
overheads of FDRU is lower fault detection coverage. DMR can detect any
fault that causes a result mismatch in the duplicate executions, while FDRU
is only able to detect a fault that results in an FU hang or invariant violation.
Detailed discussions of FDRU’s fault tolerance coverage are provided in the
following sections.
6.4.2 Fault Injection Methodology
To simulate the behavior of low-level hardware faults with high fidelity, we
applied hardware gate-level fault injection, as discussed in Section 5.1. We
modified the CrashTest fault injection framework [107] to inject the gate-level
fault to the RRHMS hardware system.
Figure 6.4 outlines the simulation flow for the fault injection experiment.
The flow starts with the synthesis of the hardware design written in hardware
description language (HDL). For RRHMS, the hardware is written in both
VHDL and Verilog. GTECH library (a technology-independent library) is
used for hardware synthesis. The Synopsys Design Compiler is used for syn-
thesis of fault injection as well, but with a different technology library. After
synthesis, a netlist file is generated with GTECH gate cells that implement
the RRHMS hardware logics.
The netlist file is then input to the Perl script in the CrashTest framework
to inject faults into the logic gates. Since the name of each GTECH cell gate
Figure 6.4: Fault injection simulation flow
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Figure 6.5: Fault injection to logic gate
Figure 6.6: Fault enable generation
starts with GTECH (such as GTECH AND and GTECH NOT), it is easy
for the Perl script to find all the logic gates. In CrashTest, the number of
logic gates into which to inject faults can be specified by the user, and then
the Perl script randomly selects the gate for fault injection. Since RRHMS
hardware is not very big (around 43,000 GTECH gates for fault injection), we
inject the fault into every logic gate for high fidelity fault injection simulation,
as a fault may happen to any gate in real life. Figure 6.5 illustrates how the
fault is injected by the Perl script. A 2-to-1 MUX is inserted into the output
of the logic gate. One of the inputs of the MUX is directly connected with
the original output of the logic gate, and the other input is connected to the
inversion of the original output. So the selection signal of the MUX is used as
the fault enable signal. When the fault enable signal is 0, the fault-injected
gate outputs its original result (as if no fault has occurred). Otherwise, it
outputs its inversion (as if a fault has occurred and flipped its output). All
the fault enable signals are ported as the inputs of the top-level module, and
the fault of each injected logic gate can be disabled or triggered in any cycle
during the simulation by setting the corresponding fault enable signal.
After fault injection, the faulty behavior of the hardware can be simulated
with the fault-injected netlist file. We use Modelsim for cycle-accurate simu-
lation instead of applying the FPGA simulation as proposed in the CrashTest
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Figure 6.7: Fault injection area of the RRHMS hardware system
framework. This is done because FPGA does not have enough programmable
ports to control all the fault enable signals (around 43,000) during RRHMS
simulation. Since we focus on transient fault detection and recovery, only
transient faults are injected, by transiently setting the fault enable signal to
1. This is realized using a random number generator and comparator as de-
picted in Figure 6.6. In each simulation cycle, the random number generator
generates an integer value r uniformly distributed between a (inclusive) and
b (exclusive). This value is compared with a pre-set value c by the compara-
tor. If r < c, the fault enable signal is set to 1, otherwise to 0. Therefore the
simulated transient fault rate is
simulated transient fault rate =
c− a
b− a
In the RRHMS fault injection simulation, each fault enable signal is con-
nected to a separate set of the fault generation system in Figure 6.6. So the
transient faults are injected into every logic gate independently. With each
pre-set fault rate (c value), the RRHMS is simulated 500 times with different
random seeds set in each simulation to collect the statistics of the simulation
results. The next section discusses the simulation results in detail.
6.4.3 Fault Tolerance Coverage
To evaluate the coverage of the proposed FDRU, we inject transient faults
at different rates into the FU area using the fault injection framework in-
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troduced in the previous section. Figure 6.7 depicts the fault injection area
of the RRHMS hardware system. Since FDRU only protects FUs, only the
logic gates of FUs are injected. This accounts for more than 93% of the
processing logics in RRHMS (FU ASIC accelerator and MIPS controller).
For comparison, faults are injected into both the baseline hardware system
without FDRU and the fault tolerant hardware system with FDRU.
The comparison results are shown in Figure 6.8. The results are collected
by injecting transient faults with six fault rates, from 4∗10−9 to 24∗10−9. The
fault rate here indicates how frequently the output of a logic gate is flipped
(by setting the corresponding fault enable signal to 1). For example, the
fault rate of 4∗10−9 means that each faulty logic gate, on average, is injected
with four faults in every 109 cycles of the hardware execution, where a fault
is injected by flipping the output of a logic gate for one cycle. This is realized
by setting the values of a, b, and c in Figure 6.6 to 0, 109, and 4, respectively.
It should be noted that the fault rate is for each single logic gate and that
the faults are injected independently for each gate. Therefore, in RRHMS
fault injection, since the FUs are synthesized to around 43,000 logic gates, at
the fault rate of 4 ∗ 10−9, a total of 43, 000 ∗ 4 = 172, 000 faults are injected
into the FUs on average in every 109 cycles of hardware execution. Faults
may be injected to an FU during its re-execution for recovery from previously
detected faults. When this happens, the new faults can be detected in the
same way by FDRU during the re-execution, as FDRU handles a re-execution
in exactly the same way it handles a normal execution (as discussed in Section
5.4).
Table 6.6: Output of the RRHMS in fault injection simulation
Fault Tolerance System
Baseline System (with FDRU)
Correct The hardware finishes execution in time,
Result and the heart rate detected is correct.
Incorrect The hardware finishes execution in time,
Result but the heart rate detected is incorrect.
System Failure The hardware does not
finish execution in time.
Either FU hang or invariant vio-
lation is detected three times in
a single MIPS-scheduled execu-
tion of the FU.
Note: In time means within five times of the supposed execution time (obtained by the
same application simulation without fault injection).
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Figure 6.8: Fault injection results comparison between baseline and fault
tolerance hardware systems (result invariants are profiled with 1000
windows of patient data (a40050 of the MIMIC II database))
For each fault rate, RRHMS is simulated 500 times with different random
seeds set for the random number generators used to enable faults (Figure
6.6). The number in parentheses in Figure 6.8 below the fault rate is the
average number of faults triggered (enabled) in the 500 simulations under the
corresponding fault injection rate. The application that runs on the fault-
injected RRHMS hardware is the RRHMS heart rate detection application
developed in this thesis (Chapter 3). Only one window of the patient data
(patient a40050 from the MIMIC II database) is used in the fault injection
simulation to save simulation time. This is because post-synthesis simulation
with 43,000 random number generations in every cycle to control the injected
faults is slow. So the output of the application is the heart rate detected
from the window by the analysis of both ABP and ECG signals. Since the
application is short (only processing one window of patient data), the fault
rate is set to be high to magnify the effects of the fault. For the fault tolerance
system, the result invariants are profiled using 1000 windows of patient data
(the result invariants of all FUs are listed in Table 5.2).
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There are three possible outputs (as listed in Table 6.6) for the fault in-
jection simulation: correct result, incorrect result, or system failure. In both
baseline and fault tolerance hardware systems, the correct result indicates
that the hardware system finishes the execution within five times the sup-
posed execution time and that the detected heart rate of the window is correct
(every output bit matches the golden result). The supposed execution time
and golden result are obtained by simulating the same application without
fault injection. The correct result happens when the injected fault does not
manifest or propagate to affect the application result. This is possible in
these cases:
(1) The fault is injected into a logic gate that is not in use in the cycle
during which its output is flipped by the injected fault.
(2) The fault affects some intermediate results but does not propagate to
the final result. For example, if the fault changes the quality of one
ABP beat from 0.9 to 0.6, the beat is still counted as good and does
not affect the ABP signal quality of the window; therefore, it does not
affect the final heart rate estimation.
(3) The injected fault is detected and fixed through re-executions in the
case of the fault tolerance system with FDRU.
On the other hand, the incorrect result in both systems means that the
hardware execution finishes within five times the supposed execution time,
but the detected heart rate is incorrect (at least one of the output bits does
not match the golden result). System failure has different meanings in the
two systems. In the baseline system, system failure means the system does
not finish the execution within five times the supposed execution time, which
is an indicator of FU hang. FU hang is usually caused by one of two scenarios:
(1) The fault is injected into the FU state controller and results in infinite
FU state loops.
(2) The fault corrupts an intermediate value used for FU control logics,
such as the loop iteration variable.
In the fault tolerance system, system failure indicates that either an FU
hang or an invariant violation is detected three times in an MIPS-scheduled
execution of the FU (FDRU enters State 5 in Figure 5.3). The fault tolerance
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hardware system never fails by exceeding five times the supposed execution
time. This is because FDRU would have detected the corresponding FU hang
before that happens.
As shown in Figure 6.8, for both baseline and fault tolerance systems, as
the fault rate increases, the percentages of the correct results in 500 simula-
tions (with different random fault injections) decrease and the percentages
of incorrect results increase. This is because with the higher fault rate, the
probability that the injected faults will impact the critical gates is higher.
The proposed fault tolerance mechanism is able to increase the correct result
percentages under each fault injection rate by detecting the FU fault and
recovering from it through re-executions. A large number of both incorrect
results and system failures (FU hangs) in the baseline system are detected
and recovered by FDRU. System failures are almost eliminated in the fault
tolerance system due to the FU hang detection with heartbeat, and the total
percentages of incorrect system behaviors (incorrect results and system fail-
ures) are reduced by at least 55.95% in all fault injection rates (e.g., reduced
from 7% to 2.4% under the 4∗10−9 fault rate). So at the fault rate of 24∗10−9,
the percentage of correct results increases from 61.00% to 85.00%. In addi-
tion, it should be noted that system failures are detected in the fault tolerance
system. Therefore, the user can be notified of the failure, even though the
baseline system cannot detect it. However, there are still incorrect results in
the fault tolerance system, since some faults may cause incorrect results that
are within the variant range and therefore not detectable by the invariant
checking of FDRU. This is the tradeoff of the FDRU’s low area (resource)
and power overheads compared with the DMR mechanism. DMR may still
have incorrect results if the faults cause the duplicated modules to give the
same incorrect results or occur to the DMR voters, but the percentage is
expected to be smaller. Implementing DMR to protect FUs for comparison
with FDRU is part of our future work.
6.4.4 Discussion of Fault Coverage
As discussed in Section 5.5, the fault detection coverage of the proposed
FDRU mechanism depends on result invariant profiling. If the profiling data
size is small, the profiled result invariant range is small, and false positives
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may occur if a new input data scenario appears. On the other hand, if the
profiling data size is large, the profiled result invariant range is likewise large,
and as a result, faults that cause a result that is incorrect but not out of range
cannot be detected. This section discusses the effect of the profiling data size
on fault tolerance coverage.
The fault tolerance results shown in Figure 6.8 are obtained by profiling
the result invariant with 1000 windows of patient (a40050) data, which are
used to run the heart rate detection application for one-window heart rate
detection. The result invariants of all FUs profiled by 1000 windows are listed
in Table 5.2. To compare fault coverage when different profiling data sizes
are used, the result invariants are also profiled with one window (just the
window used in fault injection simulations) and with 4000 windows (11.11
hours of the patient data that includes 11 arrythmia problems). Table 6.7
and Table 6.8 show the result invariants of all FUs profiled with 1 and 4000
windows, respectively. Comparing the three tables (Table 5.2, Table 6.7, and
Table 6.8), we can see that the range of each result invariant increases (the
lower bound becomes smaller and the upper bound becomes larger) as the
Table 6.7: FU result invariants, profiled with one window (10 s) of patient
data (a40050) from the MIMIC II database
Result Invariant
Functional Unit min max mindiff maxdiff
FU0 - low-pass
for ABP 49.20 97.20 –3.00 7.20
for ECG –5.24 3.60 –2.03 0.81
FU1 - slope sum
for ABP 0.00 45.00 –7.20 7.20
for ECG 0.00 4.74 –2.75 2.75
FU2 - peak detection
peak index 44.00 1178 80.00 82.00
peak number 14.00 15.00 - -
FU3 - heart rate 92.51 92.59 - -
FU4 - Kalman filter
filtered value 90.23 90.24 - -
residue 0.23 0.24 - -
FU5 - signal quality 1.00 1.00 - -
FU6 - derivative –2.03 0.81 –1.10 1.14
FU7 - squaring 0.00 4.12 –2.82 2.75
FU8 - ABP beat quality 0.99 1.00 - -
FU9 - ECG beat quality 4.64 5.45 - -
FU10 - heart rate fusion 90.23 90.23 - -
Note: the following conditions hold true during the corresponding FU execution:
yi ≥ min, yi ≤ max, yi − yi−1 ≥ mindiff , and yi − yi−1 ≤ maxdiff , where yi
is the current result value and yi−1 is the previous result value.
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Table 6.8: FU result invariants, profiled with 4000 windows (11.1 hours) of
patient data (a40050) from the MIMIC II database, during which there are
11 doctor annotated arrhythmia problems
Result Invariant
Functional Unit min max mindiff maxdiff
FU0 - low-pass
for ABP 30.00 176.10 –26.10 26.40
for ECG –9.05 8.76 –4.16 4.88
FU1 - slope sum
for ABP 0.00 110.40 –26.40 67.20
for ECG 0.00 24.07 –18.05 24.07
FU2 - peak detection
peak index 0.00 1250.00 37.00 354.00
peak number 1.00 28.00 –18.00 21.00
FU3 - heart rate 53.35 175.52 –58.43 64.31
FU4 - Kalman filter
filtered value 11.58 160.10 –35.68 22.56
residue –132.05 83.49 - -
FU5 - signal quality 0.00 1.00 - -
FU6 - derivative –4.16 4.88 –8.46 8.18
FU7 - squaring 0.00 23.81 –14.75 18.05
FU8 - ABP beat quality 0.00 1.00 - -
FU9 - ECG beat quality 1.00 34.09 - -
FU10 - heart rate fusion 71.19 160.10 –42.25 16.98
Note: the following conditions hold true during the corresponding FU execution:
yi ≥ min, yi ≤ max, yi − yi−1 ≥ mindiff , and yi − yi−1 ≤ maxdiff , where yi
is the current result value and yi−1 is the previous result value.
profiling data size increases. There are a few extra missing invariant values in
Table 6.7 compared with the other two tables. This is because only a single
result is calculated from a window for some invariant variables (such as peak
number and signal quality), so just profiling one window cannot obtain the
consecutive result difference of those variables. Therefore, those invariants
are ignored in the simulations using invariants profiled with one window.
The invariants profiled with one and 4000 windows are used to run the same
application with the same input data as with 1000 windows for fault injection
simulations. Figure 6.9 illustrates the comparisons of the transient fault
injection results between the baseline system and the fault tolerance systems
with different profiling data sizes. The result bars of each fault injection
rate are (from left to right): baseline system, fault tolerance system profiled
with one window, fault tolerance system profiled 1000 windows, and fault
tolerance system profiled with 4000 windows. The three outputs (correct
result, incorrect result, and system failure) are the same as used in Figure
6.8 and explained in Table 6.6. Similarly, each fault rate is simulated 500
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Figure 6.9: Fault injection result comparison between baseline and fault
tolerance hardware systems with different profiled data sizes
times in each system with different fault injection random seeds.
As expected, fault tolerance coverage decreases as the profiling data size
increases. This is because a larger invariant range fails does not detect faults
that cause the result to be incorrect but still within the range. However,
the coverage difference between the fault tolerance systems with different
profiling data size is small. This is because in most cases of incorrect results
caused by hardware faults the result is greatly changed by the fault and goes
out of the invariant range by a large amount. Therefore, even though the
invariant ranges are increased with more profiling data, they are still effective
in detecting most of the faults that can be detected with less profiling data.
With the profiling data size of 4000 windows, which includes 11.11 hours
of the patient data and 11 arrythmia occurrences, FDRU is still able to
reduce the incorrect system behaviors (incorrect results and system failures)
by at least 51.58% compared to the baseline system. For example, the total
percentage of incorrect results and system failures at the fault rate of 12∗10−9
is reduced from 19% to 9.2%). So, result invariants should be profiled with
long periods of patient data to reduce false positives. It is fine to set the
result invariants based on the patient’s physiological limitations, as increasing
95
the result invariant range within the patient’s physiological range does not
decrease the fault coverage by much.
Another interesting result is that as profiling data size increases, the system
failure percentage decreases (e.g., when the fault rate is 8∗10−9 and 24∗10−9
in Figure 6.9). This is because as the invariant range becomes larger, the
probability of three result invariant violations in a single MIPS scheduled FU
execution becomes smaller. Therefore, some of the previous system failures
change to incorrect results.
The fault injection results presented and discussed here are obtained with
the data of only one patient (patient a40050 from the MIMIC II database).
This is done because of the long fault injection simulation time; it takes about
a week to simulate with one patient’s data on a single computer. For the
monitoring of other patients, the result invariants need to be profiled with
the new patient data, as the physiological ranges, such as the blood pressure
range, may vary for different patients. Fault coverage results similar to those
in Figure 6.8 and Figure 6.9 are expected when other patient data is used,
because even though the physiological ranges of different patients differ, the
faulty behavior of the hardware system is similar. Most faults would result in
FU hangs and incorrect results that are far beyond the physiological ranges
and which can be easily detected and recovered from using the proposed
FDRU scheme.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This chapter concludes the thesis work introduced in the previous chapters
and discusses future work to further improve the efficiency and fault tolerance
of the proposed RRHMS.
7.1 Conclusion
This thesis presents the robust and reliable heart rate monitoring system
(RRHMS). RRHMS provides accurate, portable, and long battery life for
heart rate monitoring in real time. It is robust because it estimates the heart
rate from both ABP and ECG signals and fuses the results according to
their signal quality. It is reliable because it applies a low-overhead fault tol-
erance mechanism in the underlying hardware to provide reliable processing
for heart rate detection even with hardware faults. Design and optimization
in both algorithm and hardware have been considered in developing RRHMS.
Its heart rate detection algorithm is developed by applying algorithmic opti-
mizations to merge the separately developed ABP and ECG beat detection
steps into shared steps. The shared steps enable shared hardware modules
for efficient and portable RRHMS hardware design. The algorithmically op-
timized ABP and ECG beat detection can match the results of the original
algorithms, and the heart rate fusion applied provides continuous heart rate
monitoring when a single signal is corrupted. To efficiently support the pro-
cessing of ABP and ECG signals, an embedded hardware framework with
configurable functional units (FUs) is proposed. FUs are ASIC accelerators
that support each processing step and can be quickly configured for ABP
and ECG computations as well as for patient-specific monitoring. The pro-
posed RRHMS hardware system is implemented both on ASIC and FPGA
platforms. Compared with the Android implementation that runs on the
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Qualcomm Krait processor, both ASIC and FPGA implementations achieve
better runtime performance (20.6 and 13.7 time speedups to Android, respec-
tively) with lower power consumption (1/139 and 1/67 of Android’s power,
respectively). In the end, a fault detection and recovery unit (FDRU) is
proposed to provide low-overhead fault tolerance in FUs by applying invari-
ant checking and heartbeats. Both transient and permanent faults can be
detected by FDRU, but only transient faults can be recovered from. FDRU
improves the reliability of the RRHMS hardware system by increasing cor-
rect output percentages under injected transient hardware faults. It is also
able to reduce 55.95% of incorrect output and system failure cases at all
tested fault rates while incurring only about a 15% area (resource) overhead
in the hardware logics. During normal monitoring without hardware faults,
FDRU incurs only a 34% power overhead (due to fault detection checking)
and introduces no performance overhead.
7.2 Future Work
This section discusses the future directions we plan to explore to further opti-
mize the performance, resource utilization, and power efficiencies of RRHMS,
as well as to improve the RRHMS fault tolerance capability at with minimum
overhead.
7.2.1 Software/Hardware Partitioning
Even though the proposed RRHMS hardware system achieves much better
performance and power efficiency than the Android implementation on the
Qualcomm Krait processor, the runtime, resource, and power breakdowns
of the RRHMS hardware modules (in Table 6.4) may not achieve the best
efficiency. For example, FU8 (ABP beat quality) accounts for a large per-
centage of resource utilization (32.87% in FPGA and 16.90% in ASIC), but
its runtime percentage (9.02%) is high. This means that among the hardware
modules, FU8 spends a large amount of the resource budget, but the amount
of work it completes does not seem to justify all the resources it takes up.
Similarly, FU4 accounts for 6.34% and 9.77% of the resources in FPGA and
ASIC, respectively, but only contributes 0.29% of the application cycles. On
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the other hand, FU0 (low-pass filter) accounts for 11.88% of the application
runtime, while it takes up only 4.08% and 3.76% of the FPGA and ASIC
resources, respectively. Therefore, the current hardware modules may not
achieve the best efficiency in balancing the tradeoffs among performance,
resource utilization, and power consumption. For instance, since FU4 only
accounts for 0.29% of the runtime while using a relatively large portion of the
resource, it may be better to put its execution in the MIPS controller as the
software program. As a result, even though MIPS is not as efficient as FU4
in supporting its execution (e.g., MIPS may take five times FU4’s execution
time and expend more energy than FU4), the resources used by FU4 (6.34%
in FPGA and 9.77% in ASIC) can be saved. This boils down to trading
performance for resources (or hardware area), so the question arises: what is
the best tradeoff, the best software/hardware partitioning point? To answer
this question, a metric needs to be developed that puts different weights on
performance, resource utilization, and power consumption, and then these
weights need to be set according to the specific application requirements.
With such a metric, we can do more numeric analysis and experiments to
explore the design space to optimize the RRHMS design for efficiency.
7.2.2 Fault Behavior Analysis
The proposed fault detection and recovery mechanism of FDRU is effective
in reducing incorrect system behavior (incorrect results and system failures)
by 55.95%. However, there is still room for improvement, as the injected
faults still cause a lot of incorrect system behavior in the fault tolerance
system, especially when the fault rate is high (15% at fault rate of 24∗10−9).
Therefore, further analysis of FU fault behavior will help to improve fault
coverage at low overhead. We plan to do the following:
(1) Analyze which FU and which part of the FU is most susceptible to
hardware faults.
(2) Analyze how faults propagate to affect the application result and cause
the system to behave incorrectly.
Since the FUs are built to support the specific heart rate monitoring applica-
tion, FU behaviord, such as execution and output patterns, are application-
specific. Therefore, FU fault behaviors should be application-specific as well,
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and patterns may be found. The above two analyses are useful in finding
such patterns.
Understanding which FUs are more susceptible to hardware faults helps us
to better provide fault tolerance and allocate hardware resource. To gain this
understanding, we can inject faults at the same rate to each FU separately
and collect the output statistics. If an FU causes much higher percentages of
incorrect results and system failures, it needs more fault tolerance support.
On the other hand, if an FU causes much lower percentages of incorrect
results and system failures, its fault tolerance support can be reduced. In-
tuitively, FU8 (ABP beat quality) and FU9 (ECG beat quality) are less
susceptible to hardware faults, because a beat is classified as good as long as
its quality is above a certain threshold. So for example, if the threshold for
a good ABP beat is 0.5 and a beat’s quality is supposed to be 0.9, then as
long as the beat quality is computed to be larger than 0.5, the beat will be
classified as good and not affect the final heart rate output. This will remain
the case even if the fault causes the beat quality to be incorrectly computed
as 0.6 or 100). If this intuition is true, less hardware can be allocated for
the fault detection checking in FU8 and FU9. The saved hardware resource
can be used to strengthen the protection for FUs that are more vulnerable to
faults. As a result, with the same FDRU hardware resource budget, the sys-
tem can be made more resilient to tolerate faults. Similarly, since the FUs are
designed to be modular and follow the same design template, understanding
which part of the FU (bus/memory interface, configuration register, compu-
tation data path, state machine controller) is more vulnerable to faults helps
us to better design the FU template or to guide the fault tolerance FU design
for using the proposed hardware system architecture as the framework.
Analyzing the fault propagation path helps us find the data paths that
are most susceptible to faults so that we can select the most vulnerable ones
to protect without introducing much overhead. For example, if a data path
segment is on all the fault propagation paths that lead to incorrect outputs,
protecting this segment does not incur much overhead and can improve the
system fault tolerance capability. Analysis of fault propagation is difficult,
however. It requires back-tracing from the final incorrect output to the source
of the fault, and this process needs to be repeated with a large number of
simulations. As a result, the statistics of the data path segments can be
generated to show which segments have appeared on the most paths that
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lead to incorrect outputs.
7.2.3 Functional Units Pipelining
Currently, the FUs are scheduled by the MIPS controller to be executed one
by one. An FU is scheduled for execution only when the previous FU’s execu-
tion finishes. Even though the current design is already fast enough to meet
the real-time constraint, pipelining FU executions may gain further runtime
efficiency and allow aggressive frequency and voltage scaling to save total en-
ergy consumption and achieve longer battery life. But this is currently just
speculation and needs more analysis or experiments to verify. Pipelining FU
executions would introduce extra hardware complexity, and as a result, the
energy saving through performance gain may be paid for by the energy con-
sumed in the extra hardware logics. Although the current hardware already
has some features to support parallel FU executions, such as the design of the
memory arbiter and bus arbiter, the following modifications are still needed
for FU pipelining:
(1) Modification of the FU execution instruction to include information on
FU dependency to prevent RAW (read-after-write) hazard.
(2) Maintenance of a table in the MEM stage of the MIPS controller to
keep track of which FUs are executing and which are idle.
(3) Modification of FDRU to allow parallel FU invariant and heartbeat
checking to support parallel fault tolerance in FU executions.
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